These speeds are shown on the PFD. If a speed less than VLS or greater than VMAX is displayed on the auto-throttle, VLS or VMAX is taken into account by the latter.
- The Alpha-floor threshold, at 14°5 angle of attack, triggering a go around at a high rate if the ATHR is engaged. The throttle levers will then be advanced at a speed of 8°/s.
- The Alpha-trim threshold, at 16° minus the product calculated from the angle of attack derivative, which automatically reduces the THS setting by 4°.
- The trigger threshold for the stall warning system (audio warning and stick shaker), at 17°5.
Speed protection. The AFS includes a speed protection function that is only active in Vertical Speed mode. This is intended to maintain the aircraft within the flight speed range certified for the various configurations.
If the aircraft climbs and too high a vertical speed is selected, the speed will be reduced. When it reaches VLS + 5 kt, the LVL CHG mode replaces VS and will capture the altitude selected on the FCU. If this altitude is greater than that of the aircraft, the CLB mode will be activated, the auto-throttle will command maximum thrust and the automatic pilot will command a pitch attitude appropriate to the speed. The aircraft will continue to climb while remaining within the certified speed.
If the aircraft descends and too high a vertical speed is selected, the speed will increase. When it reaches VMAX, LVL mode CHG replaces VS. If the altitude selected is less than the altitude of the aircraft, the auto-throttle will set the engines at idle and the automatic pilot will command an attitude enabling speed to be maintained. The aircraft will continue to descend while remaining within the certified speed. The following paragraph is taken from the Airbus Industrie FCOM (see appendix 8):
| SPEED PROTECTION |
| In V/S mode, the priority will be given to the vertical speed, against the speed. |
| If vertical speed is not compatible with selected speed, the speed will decrease or increase towards VLS or VMAX. But on reaching VLS + 5 KT (when vertical speed is positive) or VMAX (when vertical speed is negative), the AP/FD will automatically change to LVL/CHG mode with selected speed as reference. |
VFE for the slats and flaps at 15° configuration is 210 kt. It is 195 kt for flaps at 20°. It is the positioning of the flaps selector and not extension thereof which introduces the new VFE. As a result, VMAX instantaneously switches from 210 to 195 kt on selection of flaps from 15 to 20°.
Further, when the speed reaches VFE + 4 kt, the system gives an audio warning in the form of a “Continuous repetitive chime”.
The intermediate approach, final approach until the onset of the pitch attitude and the stabilization phase coming out of the stall were simulated on the Airbus Industrie simulator in Toulouse and the Swissair simulator in Zurich.
The aim of this simulation was to check the behavior of the aircraft and its flyability in the different phases and unusual configurations encountered during the event.
The full (between +70 ° and -70 °) and rapid (at a maximum rate of 25 °/s) roll phase could not be simulated. However, it was demonstrated that the first roll to the left could be ascribed to the Captain's involuntarily input on the left control column horn. This input created an aileron deflection of twelve degrees, enough to bring the aircraft to the speed of 180 kt in roll at a constant rate of four degrees per second. Neither the aircraft's passing through the peak of its trajectory at an altitude of 4,100 feet nor its behavior during the stall could be simulated.
The simulation recommenced in the phase at the end of the stall, just before pullout. This was performed with a load factor of 2.1 G, which can be attributed to a combination of the following factors :
It has been shown that the aircraft without trim control can be flown, for example at a speed of 160 kt, but this situation is potentially dangerous. In fact, application of maximum thrust can at any time trigger a nose up attitude.
It should be noted that the flight crew performing the simulation was warned of the event. They were familiar with and followed the standard approach procedure naturally, particularly relative to observation of VFE, the display of altitude for go around and capture of LOC and glide. They bore in mind the procedures to cancel mode reversion or to make it virtual. They did not hesitate as the interpretation of the "whooler" nor on counter maneuver. When they applied TOGA thrust, it was checked pitch-up moment was triggered.
Under the combined effect of the out of trim condition and TOGA thrust, pull-up is clearly superior to that during rotation at take-off.
During the descent the two AP's were activated for automatic approach and landing. At 10 h 42 m 28 s, before they had intercepted the ILS localizer, the Captain deactivated them. The "cavalry charge" warning was cancelled by the flight crew, without comment.
The AP's were then to remain on OFF up to the end of the flight, with the exception of an extremely brief activation at 10 h 46 m 34 s.
When the recorded data was studied, a large number of actions on the instinctive disconnection button were noted, the first of these lasting twenty-four to thirty-two seconds started between two and six seconds after trim had reached the full nose up position. These repeated actions and the content of the conversations recorded by the CVR indicate that the Captain was in doubt as to disconnection of the AP.
Three attempts to activate the AP's were also noted after 10 h 46 m 29 s. These attempts were met by failure, probably due to the force then being exerted on the elevator control. They were marked by "cavalry charge" warnings.
On disconnection of the AP's at 10 h 42 m 28 s, the FD switched to VS and LOC modes.
The value for vertical speed VS displayed on the FCU was not announced by the flight crew. The graphs give a rate of descent of 1,500 feet/m and a slight deviation between the FD trend bar and the aircraft model.
The recorded parameters show a change from VS mode to CLB at 10 h 43 m 25 s, at the moment of flaps 20/20 selection. We saw that this was a mode reversion due to the drop in VMAX to 195 kt when the flaps were extended and a transient increase in speed. Mode reversion took place in CLB mode, and not DES, due to premature display of go around altitude of 4,000 feet. At the same moment, the throttle levers were advanced at a rate of one degree per second, this being the speed for advance during increase of thrust commanded automatically by the auto-throttle.
The following modes were then recorded:
At 10 h 44 m 37 s, the pitch attitude and roll attitude reached high values from which the PFD is, by design, automatically purged of a certain number of items of information so as to show only the more significant information. The FD bars disappeared from the screen.
The auto-throttle disconnected at 10 h 44 m 28 s due to the non-availability of angle of attack data from the sensors that were considerably disturbed by the strong inflight drift. It was to remain OFF until landing.
At 10 h 52 m 07 s, while the aircraft was on short final approach, the recording shows a switch of AFS VS mode. This second automatic mode reversion is the result of a reduction in speed to VLS+ 5 kt. As the auto-throttle was this time on stop, the throttle advance was not increased automatically. The Flight Director provided the pitch attitude to follow, which the flight crew does not seem to have noticed.
A large number of people observed the event, in particular:
Their eyewitness accounts concur and confirm the aircraft's path during the incident.
2 - ANALYSIS
The aircraft left its cruise level late, on instruction from the ATC. The IAF, the MEL VOR, was flown over at an indicated speed greater than 300 kt whereas speed is limited to 250 kt below level 100. ATC asked the flight crew, who announced a vertical speed of 4,000 feet per minute, to accelerate its descent to level 60, which, according to standard procedure, should be reached 7 NM after passing MEL.
Heading 330 given by approach control tended to bring the aircraft practically to the FAF for immediate interception of the ILS. Heading 310 reduced the closing angle for the aircraft's route in relation to the ILS axis. This angle was still too wide for the aircraft to align comfortably on the ILS and follow it immediately, all the more in that the indicated speed was still about 235 kt on interception.
This type of procedure is a practice that allows for traffic to be accelerated when meteorological conditions are favorable, which was the case. The flight crew could, however, in compliance with regulations, express its disagreement if they considered headings given would lead the aircraft to intercept the ILS too close to the final descent point. They did not do so.
There was no radio communication exchanged during the incident itself.
After the aircraft came out of the stall, the controller suggested to the flight crew that they stay on heading 180. This complies with the operational instruction aimed at keeping any aircraft with reduced maneuverability to the south of Orly. They were then left the choice of heading to return to their final approach as they wished.
New clearance for landing was given at 10 h 49 m 54 s. Note that no superfluous requests as to the cause of the incident were made by the controller.
The CVR transcription does not indicate an approach briefing. The Captain was performing an automatic approach.
In level flight at 3,000 feet, the aircraft crossed the glide slope before intercepting the localizer. The flight crew seems to have attributed non-capture of glide to automatic pilot system malfunction, whereas the system logic subordinates it to that of the localizer, and disconnected the automatic pilot. The systems configuration then became AP OFF and ATHR ON. The aural warnings announcing disconnection of the AP and downgrading from CAT 3 to CAT 1 of the system landing capability were not commented on by the flight crew.
The aircraft was now in being flown manually and locked onto the localizer at an angle of 52° at 210 kt. It was high in relation to the glide slope and to the north of the localizer axis. Aligned and set to descend, the speed was too high and the indicator for deviation in relation to the descent glide slope showed one point. The vertical speed was not commented on.
At about 2,750 feet, when the “altitude alert” signal sounded, the co-pilot selected 4,000 feet as the altitude to reach in the event of aborted approach, in order to cut off the warning signal.
This selection, before the capture of runway alignment, was premature and its value was greater than the level-off altitude following a go around.
Although the throttle levers had been in “flight idle” position, the speed remained high, the aircraft being two hundred feet above the glide slope. The Captain decided to put it in landing configuration. On each of the successive extensions of slats, flaps and landing gear, the speed was close to the maximum authorized value.
The flaps were positioned at 20 degrees as soon as the speed of 195 kt, that is VFE, was reached. A temporary and minimal excess of VFE (two knots for two seconds), perhaps on going through turbulence, was recorded. The speed protection logic then triggered mode reversion, thus initiating CLB mode due to the altitude selected being higher than the aircraft's altitude.
This change was not noted by the flight crew who were apparently not reading the FMA and did not notice the LVL CHG pushbutton illuminated on the FCU. They did not comment on the “triple click” signal.
While the throttle levers were advancing at their nominal speed on automatic by one degree per second, an action, which seems to have been unintentional and unconscious by one of the pilots, on the elevator trim control button led to deflection of the THS, at constant angular velocity, over ten seconds, up to the maximum value of thirteen degrees nose up. Although the characteristic "whooler" aural alarm was heard continuously for ten seconds, it was not commented on by the flight crew and led to no reaction from them.
This was probably the Captain's responsibility, who was at the controls. It may be explained :
This pilot has considerable experience on the BAC 111, an aircraft on which the pushbutton on the left control column horn is the automatic pilot instinctive disconnection control. We may surmise that when he sought to counter the aircraft's tendency to pitch up without understanding its origin, confusion could have set in and having reverted to old reflexes in seeking to disconnect the automatic pilot (already disconnected) he operated the control located in the same place as the AP disconnection on BAC 111.
The co-pilot's phrase “take over manually” is not sufficiently explicit. As the aircraft was no longer on automatic pilot, it would have been more appropriate to say “disconnect the auto-throttle”. This may also mean that the co-pilot believed that one automatic pilot had remained active.
In any event, deflection of the THS created a strong nose up force to the aircraft that the pilot countered by energetic efforts on the elevators, which put the aircraft in a totally out of trim situation.
This out of trim situation was the second crucial feature in the sequence of events in the incident, the first having been the AFS mode reversion.
It seems that the flight crew was unaware of this total out of trim situation. They did not carry out the instructions provided for in the event of “High Pitch Force” or “Abnormal pitch behavior” that provide a response to this situation.
As the auto-throttle was still in operation, the pilot overrode it by manually moving the throttle levers to flight idle for ten seconds before suddenly pushing them back to the maximum thrust position. Four seconds later, he moved them rapidly to flight idle for two seconds, before again pushing them to maximum thrust.
To try and explain the first positioning of the throttle levers to maximum thrust, we can propose two hypotheses :
No reason was found for the two other movements of the throttle levers and interviews with the flight crew did not contribute to an understanding of this. It is also clear that the crew, after such a stressful event, could neither remember all their actions, often probably of an instinctive nature, nor even less explain them.
Under the aerodynamic effect of THS deflection and under the mechanical effect of thrust, the aircraft was thus subjected to a nose up force that could not be controlled by elevators. It rapidly assumed an extreme pitch attitude and angle of attack.
The level of force applied on the elevators with just the left hand, while the right hand was maneuvering the engine throttle levers, induced load on the aileron controls. The aircraft then went into a regular and slow roll.
The flight crew was thus confronted by four problems, with the need to:
The Captain reached a point of saturation and so announced a MAYDAY situation, meaning he indicated that he was in a critical situation. It should be noted here that the flight crew neither acted in a coordinated manner nor relied on rules for dealing with an emergency situation. The Captain did not delegate any task or action to the co-pilot who, in turn, proposed no emergency action. Any notion of managing the flight crew seems to have been forgotten.
The FD indications on the pitch attitude to be followed to reach an altitude of 4,000 feet could only be interpreted with great difficulty by the flight crew. Also, due to high pitch attitudes, the PFD was automatically purged, to leave essential information only.
The aircraft thus reached an altitude of 4,100 feet on the verge of a stall, with a minimum recorded speed of about 35 kt. The protection system against high angles of attack cut in and reduced THS deflection from –12.7 to –8.8 degrees, and as a result, the angle of attack from 42 to 30 degrees. The PF does not seem to have noticed the THS pitch down movement, particularly given that a movement of the THS commanded by the automated systems is not announced by the “whooler”. This triggered a reduction in pitch attitude. The aircraft did, however, stall; the “Cricket” stall warning signal and stick shaker were only activated later during descent (see paragraph 2.3.2 below).
Immediately before, during and after the stall, due the unreliability of the total pressure, the ADC no longer provided speed data, resulting in automatic disconnection of the ATHR, with the throttle levers remaining in the maximum thrust position.
Just before the stall, the Captain pulled the control column fully back, bringing the elevator to 23 degrees nose up. He then pushed it fully forward, while continuing to counter the roll of 75 degrees to the right with the ailerons. The statistical data shows that, when confronted by a stall, in 80% of cases, pilots pull back the control column, in a sort of reflex movement, which continues the loss of control.
The aircraft was subjected to a series of four full and rapid rolls. The first was attributed to the force brought to bear by the pilot on the left part of the control column; the following ones were due to pilot overcompensation on the roll then the stall. Having pulled the control column fully back and thus caused maximum nose up pitch, the pilot rectified this by pushing the control column fully forward. The aircraft dipped, with its nose going under the horizon by 32°. The roll-off from +50 to –32° in seven seconds was remarkable.
During the descent, the pilot, helped by the automatic setting of the THS to –8.8 degrees, reduced angle of attack, gained speed by reducing drag, performed a gentle pull-out (load factor of 2 g for five seconds) and adjusted power. The aircraft came out of the stall at a height of eight hundred feet, still out of trim. The flight parameters were apparently stable thanks to thrust modulation.
Alpha-trim protection was automatically cancelled as soon as the aircraft came out of the stall : the THS returned to its previous deflection of –12.7 degrees. This automatic movement, without a “whooler”, seems to have gone unnoticed by the Captain. The Captain flew the aircraft, still totally out of trim, on a slightly rising trajectory, and set thrust to around 60% of N1. The speed decreased regularly and reached 140 kt. This situation carried a high potential risk : in the event of an increase in thrust for any reason, the aircraft would inevitably have started climbing with a high angle of attack.
The co-pilot, reading the ECAM, announced “Pitch trim off”. In fact, the drifting caused by the rolls had disturbed angle of attack assessment and led to their automatic disconnection. The co-pilot re-engaged them and performed tests by deflection in both directions. The “whooler” was identified and the co-pilot declared the trim setting system to be operational. He reduced deflection to –8.4 degrees. This action to reduce the THS angle was beneficial. It nevertheless remains an example of simultaneous piloting, performed without the knowledge of the pilot flying.
On an outward leg on heading 120, the aircraft at 195 kt and at 2,000 feet was now only slightly out of trim (THS –8.4 degrees nose up; pitch 8° nose down).
The Captain at first refused to use THS trim. About eighty seconds later, inputs recorded on the FDR and selector noises on the CVR show that he used it but without announcing it, by short touches identical to his way of using trim before the event was triggered. Five minutes after total deflection of the THS, the aircraft was correctly trimmed and piloting had returned to normal.
Landing took place in configuration with slats and flaps 20 , which in the final approach, led to the announcement “too low flaps” from the GPWS. LOC interception took place by visual alignment with the runway axis. The aircraft crossed the glide slope, remained above then, finally, went below it. These deviations were not announced. The “glide slope” aural warning was heard on final approach.
On final approach, on reducing speed, the AFS triggered a mode reversion from VS to SPD. As the auto-throttle was disconnected and the flight crew was getting ready to land, this new mode reversion went unnoticed.
To summarize, this second approach was neither prepared nor stabilized.
Note : the CVR shows no attempt to determine the anomaly felt on the longitudinal attitude control system, THS and pitch. More generally, there would not seem to have been actions which could be called “return to basics” on the part of the flight crew. In the present case, this would have involved:
As soon as the situation seemed to have stabilized, conversations resumed in the cockpit. Neither the auto-throttle, nor THS deflection, nor the variations in thrust were mentioned. Neither was mode reversion from VS to LVL CHG brought up. The conversation mainly concerned the AP. The flight crew did not carry out a briefing for the new approach.
2.3 Operation of AFS Protection
2.3.1 Protection of Speed Envelope
The aircraft speed exceeded VFE before capture of ILS. Note that in these circumstances, protection against an overspeed is ensured according to the two following thresholds:
The choice of LVL CHG as protection against excess speed led, in the circumstances of the incident, to an increase in thrust at a moment where the goal was to reduce speed, this being incompatible with the goal sought.
We may note that, if the automatic pilot had been active, it would have caused a nose up attitude, which would also have surprised a flight crew in the middle of intercepting a localizer and whose first objective was to reach the runway.
2.3.2 Analysis of the Stall Protection Logic
Stall protection is organized around three angle of attack thresholds, that for Alpha-floor, that for Alpha-trim and that for triggering the stall warning (see 1.16.1.4).
Alpha-floor protection could not play its role as, when angle of attack of 14.5° was reached, the throttle levers were already on maximum thrust.
Alpha-trim protection was triggered at a value for angle of attack of slightly less than 15° in conditions where the flight dynamics were close to the extreme. It should be noted that it also functioned after coming out of the stall by giving the opposite order to the THS.
The stall warning did not sound and the stick shaker did not operate in the flight phase prior to the stall. When questioned, the aircraft manufacturer indicated that the cause for non-operation of these two warnings was the disturbance of the angle of attack sensors due to the dynamics of the aircraft's movements, with the speed having dropped below 60 kt before the angle of attack reached 17.5°. The flight crew had, however, been warned of the approach of a stall by buffeting.
3.2 Probable Causes
The direct causes of the unusual attitudes and the stall to which the aircraft was subjected were a movement of the THS towards the full pitch-up position and a rapid increase in thrust, both of which maneuvers were the due to the Captain, following an AFS mode reversion which was not understood. The pitch-up force caused a sudden change in attitude that the flight crew was unable to contain with the elevators.
The following elements contributed to the incident:
4 - RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 Measures Taken
After the incident and on the basis of the first facts established as communicated by the BEA([3]), the French Civil Aviation Authority (Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile) informed French operators of the Airbus A 310 and A 300-600 (these two types have identical protection). It asked them in particular first to draw the attention of flight crews to the need to respect limit speeds provided for different aircraft configurations and, secondly, to ensure they are fully informed as to the logic of the protection system in the event of abnormal speed.
The DGAC also warned the civil aviation authorities of the countries using these aircraft, recommending them to take similar action with the operators under their authority.
4.2 Intermediate Recommendation
Following several accident investigations in which the Bureau Enquêtes-Accidents participated, the following recommendation was issued on 24 January 1995:
Various incidents or accidents (see list below) involving public
transport aircraft show the following common characteristics:
a) the pilot flying is not always aware of his action in opposition with the Automatic Flight Systems and never perceives the consequences thereof, b) the pilot not flying (even instructors) is not aware of the conflict between the pilot at the controls and the Automatic Flight Systems. As a result, the Bureau Enquêtes-Accidents recommends: - that a study be launched so that the pilot's priority over all Automatic Flight Systems is maintained in all circumstances. This could be done : a) by the disconnection of Automatic Flight Systems (automatic pilot and auto .throttle lever or auto thrust) in the event of conflict between the pilot's actions and those of the Automatic Flight System or Flight Director. b) and/or by clear information in the cockpit (possibly an alarm) warning the flight crew of such a conflict. List of events:
|
4.3 New Recommendations
4.3.1 Speed Protection System Activation Display
The flight crew noticed neither the initiation of the flight envelope speed protection nor the mode change which resulted from it. Further, we may note that the denomination "LVL CHG" is inappropriate to indicate activation of speed protection. LVL CHG is the process used and not the goal.
The BEA considers that recommendation 4.4.2 issued in the context of the investigation into the accident that occurred on 20 January 1992 near Mont Ste Odile corresponds to the problem identified here. It is repeated below, with the grounds given:
| In its analysis of this accident, the commission has been led
to note deficiencies in the effectiveness of the display to the flight
crew of the various active modes, the references used, actions in progress
and targets pursued with regard to the Autopilot devices, notably in
the vertical plane. Most particularly, in the opinion of the commission,
the total information presented is inadequate in terms of its likelihood
of alerting a crew, who at a given moment have an incorrect mental picture
of the state of the automatic devices.
In practice, a good number of observations made by the commission apply to one degree or another to all new-generation aircraft … Consequently, the commission recommends that for all new-generation aircraft: - consideration should be given by the competent authorities and organizations with a view to improving, in a standardized fashion on an international basis, the presentation and the symbols for displays and information relating to the different Autopilot active modes, notably in the vertical plane. |
4.3.2 Successive Type Ratings
The investigation showed that the Captain may have activated the trim control by mistake, wishing to activate the Autopilot instinctive disconnection, this latter control being placed in that position on the BAC 111 he had piloted before.
As a result, the Bureau Enquêtes-Accidents recommends:
- that a study, using specialists in behavioral science, examine how reflexes and habits, possibly acquired on previously flown aircraft, may be taken into account when moving on to a new type of aircraft.
Appendix 2 - Transcript of radio communications between the aircraft and the Regional Control center
Communications radio téléphoniques échangées le 24/09/94 entre ROT 381. et PARIS CONTRÔLE, Secteur AO, Fréquence 135,3
| Heures UTC | DE | COMMUNICATIONS |
| 10.25.00 |
Début d'écoute |
|
| 10.25.08 | ROT381 | PARIS, bonjour ROT 381. |
| 10.25.28 | ROT381 | ROT 381 flight level 3.5.0. |
| Paris C | ROT 381 bonjour maintain 3.5.0 and what is your present heading? | |
| ROT381 | Heading 2.9.3. | |
| Paris C | 0kay for spacing, turn left heading 2.7.0. | |
| ROT381 | Left heading 2.7.0. | |
| 10.29.47 | Paris C | ROT381 proceed Melun now |
| ROT381 | Proceeding to Melun, ROT381 … (illisible). | |
| Paris C | 0Kay, ROT381 descent down flight level 6.0. | |
| ROT381 | Descending 6.0. | |
| 10.36.35 | Paris C | ROT 381 Say your rate of descent |
| ROT381 | Two thousand. | |
| Paris C | ROT381 increase rate of descent to be steady flight level 6.0 in two minutes maximum and contact Orly 1.2.0.8.5. | |
| ROT381 | 1.2.0.8.5 bye, bye. | |
| 10.37.05 | ROT381 | Paris Orly bonjour, ROT381 |
| Paris C | ROT381 Orly 1.2.0.8.5. | |
| 10.38.00 |
Fin d'écoute |
|
FOREWORD
The following is a transcript of elements which were comprehensible, at the time of the preparation of the present report, on the cockpit voice recorder. This transcript contains conversations between crew members, radiotelephonic messages between the crew and Air Traffic Control services and various noises corresponding , for example, to the use of controls or to the alarms. The reader's attention is drawn to the fact that the recording and transcription of the CVR are only a partial reflection of events and of the atmosphere in the cockpit. Consequently, the utmost care is required in the interpretation of this document. Communications recorded on the CVR which concern other aircraft are not transcribed. In the preliminary report, the times shown in the transcript was the time read out from the CVR with the time given by the controller during VHF communications. The synchronized DAR data and CVR recording are noted here in UTC time as recorded on board the aircraft.
GLOSSARY
- UTC Time : UTC time given by the control tower recording
- Track 1 : Captain's headset microphone including conversations on VHF between the co-pilot and the ATC.
- Track 3 : Cockpit area microphone
- : Voice of the Captain
- : Voice of the Co-pilot as recorded on the CAM or on VHF during communications with ATC
- : Third person in cockpit
- PA : Public Address
- Ctl : Air Traffic Control (ATC)
- (*) : Words not understood
- (@) : Various noises, alarms
- (...) : Words or groups of words which, at the time they were spoken neither interfered with the normal conduct of the flight nor add any elements useful for the analysis or understanding of this event.
- ( ) : Words or groups of words where some doubt persists or which necessitated extensive repeated listening.
| UTC time | Track 3 Cockpit Area Microphone | Track 1 Hot Mike | VHF | Observations |
| 10h 34mn 37s | ||||
| 10h 34mn 43s | (3) (...) | |||
| 10h 34mn 47s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 34mn 49s | (3) (...) | |||
| 10h 34mn 50s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 34mn 51s | (3/2) (...) | |||
| 10h 34mn 54s | (1) (...) | Laughter | ||
| 10h 34mn 55s | (@) | |||
| 10h 35mn 10s | (@) (1) Yes | Cabin Call (1 chime) | ||
| 10h 35mn 14s | (1) Yes | |||
| 10h 35mn 16s | (2) By pass (*) Auto brakes | |||
| 10h 35mn 20s | (2) The test ! | |||
| 10h 35mn 21s | (1) I've put it on automatic to... | |||
| 10h 35mn 31s | (2) Turned to Altimeters | |||
| 10h 35mn 33s | (1) One zero one three | |||
| 10h 35mn 35s | (2) Yes, so, completed the cross check | |||
| 10h 35mn 36s | (1) Yes, Yes | |||
| 10h 35mn 38s | (3) It's turbulence which (*) | |||
| (1) Yes | ||||
| 10h 35mn 42s | (3) (...) | |||
| 10h 35mn 43s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 35mn 46s | (3) (...) | |||
| 10h 35mn 55s | (3) (...) | |||
| 10h 36mn 56s | (2/3) (...) | (1) (...) | Laughter | |
| 10h 36mn 06s | (1) (...) | Public Address Announcement | ||
| 10h 36mn 33s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 36mn 35s | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one say rate of descent | |||
| 10h 36mn 38s | (1) Four thousand | |||
| 10h 36mn 39s | (2) Four thousand | |||
| 10h 36mn 41s | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one increase rate of descent to be setting flight level six zero in two minutes maximum and contact Orly one two zero decimal eight five | |||
| 10h 36mn 50s | (1) Are you crazy ? | (2) (*) | ||
| 10h 36mn 52s | (1) Are you crazy? | |||
| 10h 37mn 00s | (1) They're crazy ! | |||
| 10h 37mn 03s | (2) (*) | |||
| 10h 37mn 05s | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one Orly one two zero eight five | |||
| 10h 37mn 11s | (1) One two zero eight five ok | |||
| 10h 37mn 13s | (2) Paris hello Tarom three eight one | End of Public Address announcement | ||
| 10h 37mn 15s | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one turn right heading three three zero for base leg runway two six | |||
| 10h 37mn 20s | (2) ...right heading three three zero for base runway two six | |||
| 10h 37mn 31s | (2) It's decided then, we're going to land ! | |||
| 10h 37mn 35s | (1) Listen to the I L S ! | |||
| 10h 37mn 45s | (2) I heard it | |||
| 10h 37mn 46s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 37mn 47s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 37mn 49s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 37mn 50s | (3) (...) | Laughter | ||
| 10h 37mn 53s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 37mn 55s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 38mn 01s | (3) (...) | Laughter | ||
| 10h 38mn 08s | (1) (...) | |||
| 10h 38mn 21s | (1) It took it | |||
| 10h 38mn 22s | (2) It took it | |||
| 10h 38mn 24s | (2) One thousand | |||
| 10h 38mn 36s | (1) Give him six zero, and ask him for the speed | |||
| 10h 38mn 39s | (2) Tarom three eight one six zero | |||
| 10h 38mn 44s | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one descend four thousand feet... correction three thousand feet on one zero one three | |||
| 10h 38mn 50s | (2) Three thousand one zero one three (*) | |||
| 10h 39mn 01s | (1) Four thousand one zero.... | |||
| 10h 39mn 03s | (2) One three | |||
| 10h 39mn 04s | (1) One three | |||
| 10h 39mn 05s | (1) Set on my side | |||
| 10h 39mn 07s | (2) (*) | |||
| 10h 39mn 11s | (2) Exactly the glide slope interception altitude | |||
| 10h 39mn 13s | (1) Yes | |||
| 10h 39mn 17s | (1) Is theI L S right ? | |||
| 10h 39mn 18s | (2) Set | |||
| 10h 39mn 19s | (1) Set on my side | |||
| 10h 39mn 34s | (1) There you are, we go into the clouds and nothing happens, we're just shaken up a bit | |||
| 10h 39mn 37s | (3) We can't see any more..... | |||
| 10h 39mn 38s | (1) Yes | |||
| 10h 39mn 40s | (3) (*) | (1) Yes, yes | Laughter | |
| 10h 39mn 43s | (1) These are good weather clouds | |||
| 10h 39mn 44s | (3) Yes, yes, yes | |||
| 10h 39mn 56s | (3) Isn't aviation wonderful! | Laughter | ||
| 10h 40mn 00s | (3) To hell with it ! | Joke | ||
| (1) Aviation is tough tough tough for us | ||||
| 10h 40mn 02s | (1) It's beautiful, just look at it ! (...) | Laughter | ||
| 10h 40mn 11s | (2/3) As we were saying | Joke | ||
| 10h 40mn 22s | (1) There it is, a runway over there see how many runways there are | |||
| 10h 40mn 30s | (2) A thousand until... (*) | |||
| 10h 40mn 31s | (1) Set | |||
| 10h 40mn 49s | (3) I think it's a pleasure to fly a thing like this | |||
| 10h 40mn 59s | (@) | Selector noise | ||
| 10h 41mn 00s | (2) Speed A S and target is set | |||
| 10h 41mn 01s | (1) Set | |||
| 10h 41mn 01s | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one turn left heading three one zero intercept I L S for runway two six | |||
| 10h 41mn 06s | (2) Left heading three one zero intercepting I L S two six | |||
| 10h 41mn 16s | (2) It's still good here | |||
| 10h 41mn 22s | (2) (*) ... Three thousand. There's a plane over there, at about three hundred d | |||
| 10h 41mn 44s | (1) Over there, somewhere, is the runway, you can see it there where there's that empty space | |||
| 10h 41mn 47s | (3) So, how long are you going to fly like this on autopilot? | |||
| 10h 41mn 50s | (1) Je peux le piloter comme çà jusqu'à ce que l'on atterrisse. Voilà, vous pouvez voir la Tour Eiffel, là devant, vous la voyez ? | |||
| 10h 41mn 53s | (3) Yes, yes, yes | (1) On voit la Tour Eiffel là où est le bâtiment noir et au dessus, à l'autre bout c'est Saint-Paul et Montparnasse.... | You can see the Eiffel Tower there where the black building is and | |
| 10h 42mn 01s | (3) Aha, Aha ! | |||
| 10h 42mn 02s | (1) ... toute la partie, là-bas | |||
| 10h 42mn 05s | (1) Slats fifteen | |||
| 10h 42mn 06s | (@) | Bruits de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 42mn 07s | (2) Set | |||
| 10h 42mn 09s | (2) One eight one | |||
| 10h 42mn 10s | (1) Set | |||
| 10h 42mn 11s | (2) On voit aussi la piste | |||
| 10h 42mn 15s | (1) Mais, il est fou ? ! | |||
| 10h 42mn 24s | (1) Mais il est fou ? ! | |||
| 10h 42mn 28s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur similaire à la palette PA qui tombe et alarme déconnexion Pilote Automatique (Cavalry charge) | ||
| 10h 42mn 30s | (2) Tiens ! il n'a pas pris la pente ! | |||
| 10h 42mn 32s | (@) | Triple click | ||
| 10h 42mn 33s | (1) Il n'a pas pris la direction ! | |||
| 10h 42mn 34s | (2) Maintenant, il l'a prise | |||
| 10h 42mn 36s | (2) (*) Vertical speed ... | |||
| 10h 42mn 37s | (@) (2) Loc star | Altitude alert (8s) | ||
| 10h 42mn 42s | (1) Tais-toi ! ... (...) | Argot | ||
| 10h 42mn 44s | (3) C'est la piste, çà ? | |||
| 10h 42mn 46s | (1) Quatre mille tu as dit ? | |||
| 10h 42mn 47s | (2) Quatre mille, Yes, Yes, pour la remise de gaz | |||
| 10h 42mn 48s | (1) C'est ça la piste ! | |||
| 10h 42mn 49s | (1) Ah, qu'est .ce que je voulait dire, sors un Slats ... | |||
| 10h 42mn 52s | (2) ... Flaps ... (@) | Bruits de sélecteur similaires à la sélection de sortie des flaps | ||
| 10h 42mn 53s | (1) ... Flaps fifteen | |||
| 10h 42mn 55s | (@) (2) je l'ai sorti | Bruit de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 42mn 57s | (1) The gear down | |||
| 10h 42mn 59s | (2) Je sors Gear Down (@) | Bruit de sélecteur similaire à la sélection de mouvement du train suivi du bruit de mouvement du train | ||
| 10h 43mn 05s | (2) (*) ça, c'est la piste | |||
| 10h 43mn 09s | (@) | No smoking gong | ||
| 10h 43mn 10s | (3) Le train ? | Bruits de sélecteurs | ||
| 10h 43mn 12s | (2) Yes, Yes il est sorti | |||
| 10h 43mn 13s | (2) C'est bien on l'a sorti (@) | Annonce Public Address.
2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim |
||
| 10h 43mn 14s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 43mn 16s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 43mn 22s | (1) Flaps twenty | |||
| 10h 43mn 23s | (@) | (1) Et, un quatre sept | Bruits de sélecteur similaires à la sélection de sortie des flaps | |
| 10h 43mn 24s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 43mn 26s | (2) Un quatre sept (@) | Bruits de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 43mn 27s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 43mn 28s | (@) | (1) Dis-lui que nous sommes on final | Triple click | |
| 10h 43mn 30s | (@) | (2) On final two six Tarom three eight one | Bruit de sélecteur | |
| 10h 43mn 32s | (@) | (Ctl) one three eight | 6 bruits de sélecteur similaires à trois actions sur le trim | |
| 10h 34mn 34s | (@) | Régime moteur en augmentation | ||
| 10h 43mn 36s | (Ctl) cleared to land three eight one wind three two hundred degrees ten knots | |||
| 10h 43mn 40s | (2) Cleared to land... Thank you | |||
| 10h 43mn 41s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 43mn 42s | (2) (*) à deux cents avec ten miles | |||
| 10h 43mn 43s | (2) Donc, à gauche | |||
| 10h 43mn 47s | (1) Hé ! qu'est-ce qu'il fait ! ? | |||
| 10h 43mn 50s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 43mn 51s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 43mn 52s | (@) (2) Prends le manuellement | Bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim pressé puis 1s plus tard début du whooler | ||
| 10h 43mn 53s | (@) | régime moteur en diminution | ||
| 10h 43mn 54s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 43mn 56s | (@) | (1) Affiche moi une vitesse ici ! | Bruit de sélecteur | |
| 10h 43mn 59s | (2) cent trente quatre ? | |||
| 10h 44mn 01s | (1) Hei, il remets les gaz !! | |||
| 10h 44mn 03s | (@) | Fin du whooler puis 0,5 s plus tard bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim relâché | ||
| 10h 44mn 04s | (@) | Bruit de régime moteur en augmentation | ||
| 10h 44mn 06s | (@) | Bruits de sélecteurs | ||
| 10h 44mn 09s | (1) Hei ! | |||
| 10h 44mn 10s | (1) Hei ! | Bruits de sélecteurs | ||
| 10h 44mn 16s | (1) Hei ! | |||
| 10h 44mn 17s | (2) Hei, mais qu'est-ce qu'il a ? ! | |||
| 10h 44mn 21s | (1) MAY DAY ! | |||
| 10h 44mn 22s | (2) Qu'est-ce que tu veux lui faire ? | (Ctl) Euh ... Tarom three eight one turn... left if you want heading one eight zero | ||
| 10h 44mn 27s | (3) Hélas, on tombe | |||
| 10h 44mn 28s | (3) On tombe, on tombe, on tombe ! | |||
| 10h 44mn 31s | (@) (2) Les Flaps ? | (1) (*) | Début des bruits aérodynamiques et pompage moteur | |
| 10h 44mn 33s | (@) | Single Chime | ||
| 10h 44mn 35s | (@) | Single Chime | ||
| 10h 44mn 37s | (@) | Continuous Repetitive Chime (3 sec) | ||
| 10h 44mn 41s | (@) | Single Chime | ||
| 10h 44mn 42s | (@) | Continuous Repetitive Chime (0,5 sec) | ||
| 10h 44mn 44s | (@) | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one do you hear me? | Alarme décrochage (Cricket)(1,5 sec) | |
| 10h 44mn 47s | (1) Aie ! | Alarme décrochage (1 sec) | ||
| 10h 44mn 48s | (Ctl) Do you hear me? | |||
| 10h 44mn 49s | (2) (*) | Alarme décrochage (1,5 sec) | ||
| 10h 44mn 52s | (VS) TERRAIN TERRAIN | (2) We get some problems! | ||
| 10h 44mn 57s | (VS) WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP | Annonce Public Address | ||
| 10h 45mn 01s | (2) Doucement, doucement à droite | |||
| 10h 45mn 03s | (2) Lève-la ! | |||
| 10h 45mn 06s | (2) Qu'est-ce qu'il a ? ! | |||
| 10h 45mn 08s | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one if you hear me as you like for landing two six | |||
| 10h 45mn 13s | (2) We've have some problems with the Auto Pilot ! | |||
| 10h 45mn 18s | (@) (2) Non, mais il ne déconnecte pas | Fluctuations de régime moteur | ||
| 10h 45mn 23s | (2) Veux-tu, que je rentre le train ? | |||
| 10h 45mn 25s | (1) Non, non | |||
| 10h 45mn 29s | (2) Veux-tu, que je rentre le train ? | |||
| 10h 45mn 30s | (1) Non | |||
| 10h 45mn 32s | (1) Rentre le train ! | |||
| 10h 45mn 33s | (1) Hei rentre le train ! | |||
| 10h 45mn 34s | (2) Je le rentre (@) | Bruits de sélecteur similaires à la sélection de mouvement du train puis bruits de mouvement du train | ||
| 10h 45mn 37s | (@) | No smoking gong | ||
| 10h 45mn 41s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 45mn 42s | (3) C'est fini ? ! | |||
| 10h 45mn 43s | Annonce Public Address | |||
| 10h 45mn 44s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 45mn 45s | (2) Pitch trim off ! (@) | Bruit de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 45mn 47s | (2) Pitch trim off ! | |||
| 10h 45mn 52s | (@) | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one do you want to come back on the I L S now | Bruit de sélecteur | |
| 10h 45mn 55s | (3) Il s'asseyait sur la queue ? | |||
| 10h 45mn 55s | (1) Just a moment | (2) Just a moment please, just a moment | ||
| 10h 45mn 58s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim pressé suivi 1 seconde plus tard par le whooler pendant 2 secondes puis bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim relâché | ||
| 10h 46mn 00s | (@) | (Ctl) Yes are you? do you agree to ... to turn left on the I L S now?
(2) Yes we can do it |
Bruits de sélecteur similaires à plusieurs actions sur le trim | |
| 10h 46mn 04s | (3) Comment, est-ce qu'on peut décrocher comme ça ? | (1) We... | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | |
| 10h 46mn 06s | (@) (2) Le voilà, il fonctionne correctement | (1) (*) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | |
| 10h 46mn 07s | (2) Descends un peu pour que je ... | |||
| 10h 46mn 09s | (@) | (1) Reste comme çà ! | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | |
| 10h 46mn 10s | (2) Il reste à l'horizontal | |||
| 10h 46mn 13s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur | ||
| 10h 46mn 16s | (1) Laisse-le, laisse-le, pour que je le sente | |||
| 10h 46mn 17s | (2) Je le laisse | |||
| 10h 46mn 19s | (2) Yes, pour augmenter un peu la vitesse (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 46mn 22s
10h 46mn 23s |
(2) Extraordinaire ! (@) | Bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim pressé suivi 1 seconde plus tard par le whooler pendant 1 seconde puis bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim relâché | ||
| 10h 46mn 25s | (2) Est ce que je connecte le Pilote Automatique ? | Diminution régime moteur | ||
| 10h 46mn 27s | (1) Yes, connecte-le ! | |||
| 10h 46mn 28s | (2) Hai (interjection), il marche | |||
| 10h 46mn 29s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur similaire à la palette PA qui tombe puis alarme déconnexion Pilote Automatique (Cavalry charge) | ||
| 10h 46mn 31s | (2) Il s'est rendu tranquille maintenant ... (...) (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 46mn 33s | (1) Connecte le Pilote Automatique ! | |||
| 10h 46mn 35s | (2) Je l'ai connecté ! | Bruit de sélecteur similaire à la palette PA qui tombe puis alarme déconnexion Pilote Automatique (Cavalry charge) | ||
| 10h 46mn 37s | (1) Connecte le Pilote Automatique ! | |||
| 10h 46mn 38s | (2) J'ai connecté le deuxième | |||
| 10h 46mn 39s | (@) | Cavalry charge | ||
| 10h 46mn 40s | (2) Il ne se connecte plus ! | |||
| 10h 46mn 42s | (2) Auto Pilot off ! | |||
| 10h 46mn 43s | (@)) | Cavalry charge | ||
| 10h 46mn 45s | (1) Dis-lui que nous sommes sur ce cap.. et ... nous avons des problèmes ! | |||
| 10h 46mn 47s | (@) | Cavalry charge | ||
| 10h 46mn 49s | (2) Paris, Tarom three eight one | |||
| 10h 46mn 54s | (2) Paris, Tarom three eight one | |||
| 10h 46mn 58s | (1) Hei ! | |||
| 10h 46mn 59s | (2) Il n'entend pas ! | |||
| 10h 47mn 00s | (1) Change la station radio | |||
| 10h 47mn 04s | (2) Zero ... five | |||
| 10h 47mn 06s | (3) Pose le sur un de ces champs | Blague | ||
| 10h 47mn 10s | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one turn left heading zero one zero | |||
| 10h 47mn 14s | (2) Tarom (*) zero one zero we are maintening two thousand now | |||
| 10h 47mn 19s | (1) Hei ! | |||
| 10h 47mn 20s | (Ctl) Do you have full control of your aircraft now? is it ok for you? | |||
| 10h 47mn 22s | (1) Euh... for the moment | (2) Approximately fifty percent of... about fifty percent is under control | ||
| 10h 47mn 36s | (2/3) (*) | (2) Do you read? | ||
| 10h 47mn 37s | (1) Sur quelle radio station es tu ? | |||
| 10h 47mn 39s | (Ctl) Do you request assistance after landing Tarom three eight one? | |||
| 10h 47mn 42s | (1) Affirmative | |||
| 10h 47mn 43s | (2) Affirm, affirm we are on heading now zero seven zero maintening two thousand | |||
| 10h 47mn 48s | (Ctl) Yes, turn left heading zero one zero | |||
| 10h 47mn 51s | (2) Left heading zero one zero | |||
| 10h 47mn 54s | (2) (...) qu'est-ce qu'il a fait ? | Argot | ||
| 10h 47mn 56s | (1) Hei ! | |||
| 10h 47mn 58s | (2) Presque la limite | |||
| 10h 47mn 59s | (1) Je n'ai jamais rencontré ça de ma vie | |||
| 10h 48mn 00s | (2) Moi, non plus | |||
| 10h 48mn 02s | (3) J'ai eu une telle malchance ? | |||
| 10h 48mn 04s | (1) Je ne sais pas ce que ... | |||
| 10h 48mn 06s | (3) Non ? | |||
| 10h 48mn 07s | (1) Il s'est passé quelque chose ici | |||
| 10h 48mn 10s | (2) Le pilote automatique a quelque chose | |||
| 10h 48mn 12s
10h 48mn 13s |
(2) Allons nous trimer (@)
(3) Prend-le à la main |
(Ctl) Tarom three eight one turn left heading three zero zero to intercept your I L S | Bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim pressé suivi 1 seconde plus tard par le whooler pendant 1 seconde puis bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim relâché | |
| 10h 48mn 16s | (2) Understood left heading on zero one zero to intercept the I L S for two six | |||
| 10h 48mn 21s | (2) Tu l'entends ? | |||
| 10h 48mn 22s | (1) Hà ? | |||
| 10h 48mn 23s | (@) | Bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim pressé suivi 1 seconde plus tard par le whooler pendant 1 seconde puis bruit de sélecteur similaire au bouton de trim relâché | ||
| 10h 48mn 24s | (2) Regarde, le Trim comme il est parti | |||
| 10h 48mn 25s | (1) C'est çà ! Laisse-le ! | |||
| 10h 48mn 27s | (1) Laisse-le comme ça ! | |||
| 10h 48mn 28s | (2) Je l'ai laissé, tu le sens bien ? | |||
| 10h 48mn 31s | (1) Quelle distance donne-t-il ? | |||
| 10h 48mn 33s | (2) Zero one zero | |||
| 10h 48mn 35s | (2) Tu es a dix mille | |||
| 10h 48mn 39s | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one turn left heading three zero zero, intercept I L S | |||
| 10h 48mn 42s | (2) Left ... | |||
| 10h 48mn 43s | (2) Left heading zero ... | |||
| 10h 48mn 45s | (1) Three zero zero | |||
| 10h 48mn 46s | (2) Three zero zero intercepting I L S two six | |||
| 10h 48mn 49s | (Ctl) Three zero zero | |||
| 10h 48mn 51s | (2) Three zero zero | |||
| 10h 48mn 54s | (2) Tu le sens bien, Yes ? | |||
| 10h 48mn 56s | (1) Il est comme ça ! | |||
| 10h 48mn 58s | (2) Il a quelque chose ... (*) (@) | Diminution régime moteur | ||
| 10h 49mn 00s | (2) On peut sortir les Flaps ok ? | |||
| 10h 49mn 03s | (2) On peut sortir les Flaps ? | |||
| 10h 49mn 04s | (1) Non, Non ! | |||
| 10h 49mn 07s | (1) Laisse comme-ça ! | |||
| 10h 49mn 08s | (2) (*) je le laisse | |||
| 10h 49mn 13s | (2) Tu vois la piste, non ? | |||
| 10h 49mn 14s | (1) Yes | |||
| 10h 49mn 18s | (2) (*) | |||
| 10h 49mn 20s | (1) Tiens une main sur les moteurs ! | |||
| 10h 49mn 21s | (2) Je les tiens, je les tiens. | |||
| 10h 49mn 25s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 49mn 27s | (3) (*) vous l'avez en manuel | |||
| 10h 49mn 30s | (2) On a pris le localizer .... ? | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one you are cleared for final approach two six call one one eight seven | ||
| 10h 49mn 34s | (2) One eighteen seven bye bye | |||
| 10h 49mn 40s | (2) (...) | |||
| 10h 49mn 50s | (3) Turbulence ? | (2) Tower bonjour Tarom three eight one | ||
| 10h 49mn 50s | (@) | (1) Quelle turbulence ? il est responsable! | 2 bruits de selecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | |
| 10h 49mn 52s | (@) | 2 bruits de selecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 49mn 54s | (@) | (Ctl) Tarom three eight one cleared to land two six two two zero degrees twelve knots | 2 bruits de selecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | |
| 10h 49mn 58s | (@) | (2) We are cleared to land | 2 bruits de selecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | |
| 10h 50mn 00s | (2) Train, Flaps, je sors quelque chose ? | |||
| 10h 50mn 02s | (@) | (1) Sors le trains ! | Bruits de selecteur similaire à une action de mouvement du train suivi par le bruit de mouvement du train | |
| 10h 50mn 07s | (2) Nous ne devons plus utiliser le Pilote Automatique ! | |||
| 10h 50mn 10s | (1) Ah ? | |||
| 10h 50mn 11s | (2) Nous ne devons plus utiliser le Pilote Automatique, amène le en manuel | |||
| 10h 50mn 13s | (@) | No smoking gong | ||
| 10h 50mn 14s | (1) Sûrement ! | |||
| 10h 50mn 19s | (2) Je sors des Flaps ? | |||
| 10h 50mn 21s | (1) Moi, ... | |||
| 10h 50mn 22s | (2) Il a commencer à remettre les gaz, je ne sais pas pourquoi, mais il a remis les gaz sans raison | |||
| 10h 50mn 28s | (1) Tu sais... quel a été le problème ? | |||
| 10h 50mn 29s | (2) Dis-le | (1) Les moteurs augmentaient la puissance et il a commencer à monter ... | ||
| 10h 50mn 32s | (2) J'ai vu, j'ai poussé moi aussi, j'ai poussé moi aussi | |||
| 10h 50mn 34s | (1) Il a commencé à monter, je ne pouvais pas le contrôler, comme ça, je ne pouvais pas le contrôler. | |||
| 10h 50mn 40s | (2) Flaps, Yes ? | |||
| 10h 50mn 41s | (1) Attends ! la vitesse, sélecte-moi... | |||
| 10h 50mn 43s | (2) Ah... j'ai vu la vitesse | |||
| 10h 50mn 45s | (1) Sors, sors les Flaps | |||
| 10h 50mn 47s | (@) (2) Fait ! | Bruits de sélecteur similaires à l'action de sélection des flaps | ||
| 10h 50mn 58s | (2) Nous l'avons récupéré du décrochage ! | |||
| 10h 50mn 59s | (1) Flaps vingt...Yes,... nous l'avons récupéré du décrochage | |||
| 10h 51mn 04s | (3) Il n'y a plus de problème, non ? | |||
| 10h 51mn 05s | (2) Non, il n'y en a plus ... non | |||
| 10h 51mn 06s | (1) Reste tranquille ! | |||
| 10h 51mn 07s | (3) (...) | |||
| 10h 51mn 08s | (@) (2) Je t'ai mis Flaps twenty | Bruit de sélecteur similaire à l'action de sélection des flaps | ||
| 10h 51mn 09s | (1) Yes | |||
| 10h 51mn 10s | (2) One four seven | |||
| 10h 51mn 18s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 20s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 21s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 22s | (2) Donc, il stabilise et la vitesse décroît (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 24s | (2) C'est bien, garde la comme ça... | |||
| 10h 51mn 25s | (1) Tiens la vitesse, s'il te plaît ! | |||
| 10h 51mn 26s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 29s | (2) Je te réduirai d'eux. Je vais t'aider (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 29s | (1) Fait attention, laisse moi ça, pour que je n'ai ... | |||
| 10h 51mn 30s | (2) (*) | |||
| 10h 51mn 31s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 35s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 38s | (2/3) Comme ça... | |||
| 10h 51mn 40s | (2) Je te tiens la vitesse | |||
| 10h 51mn 41s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 43s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 46s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 49s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 50s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 51s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 55s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 56s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 57s | (@) | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | ||
| 10h 51mn 59s | (2) Tu veux Flaps fourty | |||
| 10h 52mn 00s | (1) Lâche le manche | |||
| 10h 52mn 01s | (2) Flaps fourty, d'accord ? | |||
| 10h 52mn 02s | (@) | (1) Non, Non | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim | |
| 10h 52mn 03s | (VS) FOUR HUNDRED | |||
| 10h 52mn 04s | (2) Mais, laisse que je te les mette une autre fois ! | Blague | ||
| 10h 52mn 06s | (2) Tu vas voir ! | Blague | ||
| 10h 52mn 08s | (VS) THREE HUNDRED | |||
| 10h 52mn 09s | (2) Reste-là ! | |||
| 10h 52mn 10s
10h 52mn 11s |
(@) (VS) TOO LOW FLAPS, TOO (@) LOW FLAPS, TOO LOW FLAPS | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une
action sur le trim
2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim |
||
| 10h 52mn 13s | (2) Flaps, d'accord ? | |||
| 10h 52mn 14s | (2) Je te met fourty ? | |||
| 10h 52mn 16s | (@) (VS) GLIDE SLOPE, ... | 2 bruits de sélecteur similaires à une action sur le trim, le glide slope est annoncé 7 fois | ||
| 10h 52mn 18s | (1) Tais-toi ... (...) | |||
| 10h 52mn 20s | (VS) FOURTY | |||
| 10h 52mn 21s | (VS) THIRTY | |||
| 10h 52mn 22s | (VS) TWENTY | |||
| 10h 52mn 23s | (2) Je l'ai retenue ! (VS) TEN | (1) Retiens ta main ! | ||
| 10h 52mn 25s | (@) | Bruit similaire à l'atterrissage |
[1] Except where otherwise indicated, times shown in this report are expressed in Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) and are reset in relation to the aircraft's on-board clock. Two hours should be added to obtain the legal time applicable in metropolitan France on the day of the incident.
[2] This paragraph uses a convention whereby exchanges in Romanian translated into English are shown in Italics while speech originally in English is shown in normal characters.
[3] See preliminary report, published 3 November 1994.