



Accident to Airbus A320 registered F-HBNJ on 20/08/2026 near Ajaccio AD


The below summary focuses on flight crew operational procedures.

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Flight through an area of severe convective turbulence, during descent

SCENARIO

- Descent conducted in IMC.
- Detection of echoes with the functional manual airborne weather radar, too late (around 1 min before) to define an avoidance strategy.
- "Fasten seatbelt" light preventively used, CC informed PAX through the standard 'approach' safety announcement without mentioning the turbulence.
- Aeroplane entered an isolated convective cell at FL 260 and flew through an area of severe turbulence (+3.2 g / - 0.2 g) with hail.
- The convective cell had developed 45 min earlier, with liquid water precipitation, and was in a rapid development phase when the aeroplane entered it.
- Information about the presence of the cell was available on tools such as eWAS, but also available to the ATCO on an additional screen (4Me system). This information was not used during the sequence.
- After the turbulence, the evaluation of the seriously injured CC members (3) and PAX (2) was not properly carried out. The captain and the purser postponed the assessment of the situation to after arrival.
- The captain chose to prioritize flying the approach and did not transmit an AIREP.



CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

A relatively high workload in the preceding 15 min:

- arrival briefing and performance calculations, flight path changes, radio frequency changes, discussions about the presence of a PAX in the forward galley, acquisition of weather conditions at the neighbouring aerodromes, PAX information announcement.

A possible reduction in vigilance for the descent that may have degraded the active monitoring:

- the pre-departure weather forecasts were favourable for the flight over the sea. Additionally, the isolated convective cell had not been identified using eWAS, which was consulted before descent.

The use of a manual airborne weather radar:

- requires regular manual adjustments to the tilt, in a flight phase during which the pilots had an important workload.

The absence of information provided by ATCO about the convective cell on the aeroplane's flight path:

- ATCO may overestimate airborne weather radar capabilities and consequently underestimate the need to provide additional weather information.

SAFETY MESSAGES

- **@Pilots – An area of severe turbulence may be detected late by pilots.** Effective avoidance is based on active use of the radar and early detection. Use of modern connected tools such as eWAS that includes EDR reports, information provided by ATCO and AIREP information provided by other crews can improve awareness.
- **@CC & pilots – Communication.** The sharing of information between the cockpit and the cabin contributes to a better assessment of the situation and facilitates decision-making. Establishing feedback is essential for effective communication between the cabin and the cockpit, in both directions.
- **@Crews – Prior information for the emergency services.** This information enables ground services to allocate a suitable area at the airport for emergency operations and scale the emergency response appropriately.

[For detailed information please view the full report](#)