






Serious incident to the Bombardier CRJ-1000 registered F-HMLD on 20/10/2021 near Nantes

The summary below focuses on flight crew operational procedures.

QNH read-back error, triggering of a MSAW on final approach

SCENARIO

- Ongoing storm
- o Cleared:
 - to descend (first altitude below the transition level) with QNH 1002
 - to conduct a RNP approach on RWY 21
- PM incorrect readback of QNH → 1021 | Not detected by ATC or PF
- No check of QNH with another source (as per existing operator's procedures)
- About 530 ft below published path | Not detected by crew or ATC
- MSAW warning → ATC message: without QNH or "immediately"
- o 30 sec of ATC/crew exchanges before detecting QNH error
- RWY in sight + bad weather on missed approach path → crew decision not to go around (despite existing operator's procedure for MSAW)



CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

to the altimeter setting error

- High workload/stormy conditions → detrimental to SOP (QNH cross-checked with multiple sources)
- Controller's conflict resolution elsewhere → detrimental to hearback

to the non-detection of the erroneous final path

Inherent limitations of Baro-VNAV function

On Baro-VNAV approaches, altitude-distance checks are ineffective in case of QHN error

- o Radio altimeter "consistency check" not a robust barrier
- ATC radar display using 1013 hPa

to the reaction time to the MSAW

- No QNH information or "immediately" indicated in the ATC message
- Crew surprise effect

SAFETY LESSONS

@Pilots: importance of QNH cross-check against another source

o 1st step of the altimeter cross-check

@Operations managers: importance of reinforcing awareness of the Baro-VNAV particularities

- QNH cross-check against another source: basic airmanship or to be added to SOP?
- O Why not explore availability of "Altimeter Monitor" function on the fleet?
- MSAW from ATC: are your crew prepared (procedure/training)?

