



Accident to the RANS S6 ES Coyote II
identified **71HQ**
on Saturday 20 September 2025
on Creusot - Le Gros Chaillot microlight strip

Time	Around 10:25 ¹
Operator	Private
Type of flight	Local
Persons on board	Pilot
Consequences and damage	Pilot fatally injured, microlight destroyed
This is a courtesy translation by the BEA of the Final Report on the Safety Investigation. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French is the work of reference.	

**Staying on backside of power curve during take-off, stall,
collision with ground**

1 HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT

Note: the following information is principally based on statements.

The day of the accident, a meeting had been planned between several members of the microlight club of private Creusot - Le Gros Chaillot microlight strip. In this context, the pilot of the accident who was also president of the club, met the owner of 71HQ, a member of the club. They carried out the walk-around inspection of the microlight together.

The president took off on board 71HQ at around 10:25 from runway 29². During the take-off, the microlight adopted a steep nose-up attitude and at a height of around 50 m, suddenly banked in a right-hand roll before colliding with the vegetation and then the ground.

2 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

2.1 Examination of site and wreckage

The wreckage was situated around 200 m north of the threshold of runway 11.

The damage observed on the wreckage showed that the aircraft collided with vegetation and then the ground in a steep nose-down attitude.

The flight controls were continuous at the time of the accident. The flaps were in the flaps 1 position.

¹ Except where otherwise indicated, the times in this report are in local time.

² Unpaved runway measuring 300 m X 30.

There was fuel in the two fuel tanks. The fuel system was continuous. The throttle lever was found in the idle position when the emergency services intervened, however this could have moved during the collision. Likewise, the power cut-off button, which was found activated, may have engaged at the time of the impact. It was not possible to evaluate the amount of torque provided by the engine at the time of the collision. The BEA did not carry out additional examinations of the engine as the various statements indicated that there was no engine problem.

The examination of the wreckage did not find signs of damage or incorrect operation prior to the loss of control.

2.2 Meteorological information

Based on the AROME model, Météo-France estimated that the weather conditions at 10:00 in the area of the microlight strip were as follows:

- wind varying in direction of a speed of 2 kt at surface level. However, the wind rapidly strengthened on gaining altitude and reached a speed of around 20 kt, from the south-south-east at a height of 1,100 ft (altitude of 2,600 ft);
- CAVOK;
- outside air temperature of 19.5°C and dew point temperature of 13°C.

One of the club members who took off with a flex-wing microlight shortly after the accident, indicated that the wind was from the south and that the conditions were turbulent.

2.3 Microlight information

The RANS S6 ES Coyote II is a two-seat fixed-wing microlight. 71HQ had a maximum take-off weight of 421 kg and was equipped with a two-stroke ROTAX 582 engine providing 46 hp. The RANS S6 has four flap positions: 0°, 11°, 30° and 43°. The operating manual recommends using flaps 1 (11°) for take-offs. Moreover, the operating manual indicates that the rotation speed with an average weight of 360 kg is 55 km/h and that the best rate of climb speed is 90 km/h with the flaps retracted. The microlight was not equipped with a stall warning system.

The maintenance documentation provided by the owner indicated that the aircraft had not flown for around two years before the accident flight. Maintenance operations and taxiing on the ground had been carried out during this period according to the owner's records. The owner added that the fuel in the fuel tanks had been drained and replaced in May 2025.

The weight and balance of 71HQ at the time of the accident were within the envelope fixed by the manufacturer.

2.4 Pilot information

The 63-year-old pilot held a microlight pilot license. He obtained the flex-wing rating in August 1990 and the paramotor and fixed-wing ratings in April 1993.

Moreover, he had held an aeroplane basic pilot licence³ issued in November 1991. This licence was valid until September 1994 at which time it was not renewed. Between 1991 and 1994, the pilot had carried out 82 aeroplane flight hours.

According to statements, the pilot had not flown on an aeroplane or fixed-wing microlight in the following years.

In January 2025, he started flying fixed-wing microlights again. He had totalled 12 flight hours as pilot-in-command and 5 h 30 min with an instructor.

The pilot had a lot of flex-wing experience and took part in short landing and take-off competitions.

2.5 Statements

2.5.1 Eyewitnesses

Three members of the strip's microlight club, including the owner of 71HQ, witnessed the take-off of 71HQ. They indicated that they did not see the take-off run, but that when they perceived the microlight, it was slightly offset to the right-hand side of the runway with a steep nose-up pitch attitude and low speed. On arriving at the end of the runway, when it was at a height of around 50 m, the microlight suddenly rolled to the right-hand side before colliding with the ground. The three witnesses indicated that they heard the constant noise of the engine during the take-off.

They explained that the pilot had started flying fixed-wing microlights again at the beginning of 2025 and that he flew a Super Guépard from a flying club based at another aerodrome. He had notably carried out several touch-and-goes with the Super Guépard on the Creusot microlight strip a few days before the accident.

2.5.2 Additional information provided by the owner

The owner indicated that he had not flown for two years due to health problems. For this reason, he planned to bequeath 71HQ to the strip's microlight club of which he was a member.

The morning of the accident, the president of the club joined him on the microlight strip at around 09:30. The owner carried out several checks, with the president, on the microlight. They connected the battery and checked the engine, in particular the spark plugs and coolant, before starting it. They then carried out the walk-around inspection as described in the microlight operating manual.

The president then wanted to fly the microlight. The owner explained that he had confidence in the piloting abilities of the president and that the latter knew the take-off speeds. The owner indicated that he had reminded him of these before the flight. The owner explained that during the take-off, the rotation should be carried out at around 70 km/h, followed by acceleration in level flight to reach 90 km/h before taking a positive rate of climb.

³ The aeroplane basic pilot license allows its holder to fly solo, during daylight hours, an aeroplane or glider with an integrated engine, of the same model on which the licence was obtained, and which is operated without remuneration. However, the licence holder may only fly outside controlled or regulated airspace and within a 30 km radius of the departure aerodrome. As per paragraph 4.6.2 of Chapter IV of the Annex to the Order of 31 July 1981 concerning the certificates, licenses, and ratings of non-professional civil aviation flight crew.

He added that the two 30 l fuel tanks on the microlight were full before the flight. According to him, the engine had been running between 15 and 20 min on the ground before the take-off.

2.5.3 Statement from pilot's instructor on Super Guépard

The accident pilot had carried out seven flights with an instructor before being authorized to fly solo on the Super Guépard. This instructor indicated that the pilot had not had difficulties with piloting fixed-wings. The number of flights carried out were due to certain difficulties, notably the management of the radio in controlled airspace.

The instructor indicated that for the Super Guépard equipped with a Rotax 912 engine, take-off should be carried out with flaps 1 and the speed held at around 100 km/h in initial climb. He added that the Super Guépard has a rapid acceleration and that in order not to exceed the VFE of 115 km/h, the pilot must hold a steep nose-up attitude.

The take-off procedure in the Super Guépard operating manual indicates that the rotation should be started at around 60 km/h and that on reaching 90 km/h, the pilot should directly climb. This same manual indicates that the best rate of climb speed with and without flaps is 100 km/h and that the VFE is 120 km/h.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions are solely based on the information which came to the knowledge of the BEA during the investigation.

Scenario

During the take-off, the pilot very probably held an excessive nose-up pitch attitude after the rotation. The microlight probably stayed on the backside of the power curve and progressively lost speed before stalling and then colliding with the ground.

Contributing factors

The following factors may have contributed to the aircraft staying on the backside of the power curve during take-off:

- the pilot's lack of experience on the RANS S6 equipped with a Rotax 582 engine which, unlike the fixed-wing microlights which he had recently flown, cannot take off with a steep nose-up pitch attitude;
- the absence of a stall warning on 71HQ which meant that the pilot's attention was not drawn to the microlight's low air speed.

The BEA investigations are conducted with the sole objective of improving aviation safety and are not intended to apportion blame or liabilities.