



Accident to the EVEKTOR AEROTECHNIK TeamEurostar
identified **59CXR**
on Sunday 3 August 2025
at Thézac

Time	Around 17:20 ¹
Operator	Private
Type of flight	Local
Persons on board	Pilot
Consequences and damage	Pilot fatally injured, microlight destroyed
This is a courtesy translation by the BEA of the final report on the safety investigation. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French is the work of reference.	

Collision with ground, post-impact fire

1 HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT

The pilot took off from Fumel - Montayral aerodrome² for a local flight. When the microlight was south of the aerodrome, a witness saw it take a steep nose-down attitude. A few seconds later, the microlight collided with the ground. Witnesses heard an explosion and the microlight caught fire. The fire rapidly spread to the surrounding vegetation.

2 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

2.1 Site and wreckage information

The wreckage was found in a meadow on the extended centreline of runway 35, around 1.5 km from the threshold.

A field investigator went to the accident site. The wreckage was grouped together, seemed to be complete and was lying upside down on the ground. There were few marks on the ground. The observations indicated that the microlight had a steep nose-down attitude and a left bank when it collided with the ground.

¹ Except where otherwise indicated, the times in this report are in local time.

² Paved runway 17/35 measuring 710 m x 18.




Figure 1: overall view

The damage resulting from the fire meant that it was not possible to draw any conclusions about the condition of the microlight before the accident. The damage observed on the propulsion system was the result of the collision with the ground. The ground fire destroyed the components of the ignition, lubrication and fuel systems making it impossible to be conclusive about these systems.

2.2 Microlight information

The Evektor TeamEurostar is a two-seater, fixed low-wing microlight, equipped with a tricycle landing gear, Rotax 912 ULSFR engine and a three-blade propeller.

59CXR was built in 2003. The pilot had owned it since 2017. He had carried out maintenance jobs which could be likened to a general overhaul just after purchasing it, without contacting the engine manufacturer. In 2018, he installed a mechanical catch limiting the opening of the canopy should it become unlocked in flight, as required by service bulletin No EV97-033a SR.

The pilot carried out the maintenance jobs helped by a friend who also owned a microlight. The latter indicated that the last jobs carried out in the previous months were an oil change, replacement of spark plugs and checking liquid levels. The pilot had also recently adjusted the propeller pitch. He had flown since this adjustment and had not reported any particular problem.

2.3 Analysis of recorded data

The examinations of the pilot's telephone and tablet did not obtain data regarding the accident flight that was sufficiently precise for analysis.

The recorded radar data did not contain data concerning the microlight.

2.4 Meteorological information

Météo-France estimated that the meteorological conditions on the accident site were: wind from 320° to 340° of 6 kt with gusts of 13 kt, CAVOK, temperature 29°C, dew point temperature 9 °C, QNH 1,021 hPa, light turbulence.

2.5 Pilot information

The 72-year-old pilot held a fixed-wing microlight pilot certificate. He flew regularly, mainly carrying out local flights. From time to time, he carried out small cross-country flights of a few hours. The investigation was not able to precisely determine the pilot's experience.

At the date of publication of this report, the BEA had not obtained the results of the pilot's autopsy.

2.6 Statements

The pilot tried to contact his wife by telephone at 17:05, i.e. 15 min before the accident, probably before taking off, and did not leave a message.

The vice-president of Fumel - Montayral flying club, who had flown before the accident, indicated that there was turbulence, notably in the area of the accident. She specified that the pilot was familiar with the aerodrome and knew this phenomenon.

A witness on the ground stated that they saw the microlight nose down towards the ground, heard the collision of the microlight with the ground and then an explosion. Two other witnesses indicated that they had heard an engine noise before the collision with the ground and the explosion. One of the witnesses immediately called the emergency services at 17:20.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions are solely based on the information which came to the knowledge of the BEA during the investigation.

Scenario

The pilot possibly lost control of the microlight during the last turn or during the final approach to runway 35.

The investigation was not able to determine the causes of the accident.

The BEA investigations are conducted with the sole objective of improving aviation safety and are not intended to apportion blame or liabilities.