

**SERIOUS INCIDENT TO THE AIRBUS A320 REGISTERED TS-INP OPERATED BY NOUVELAIR
AND TO THE AIRBUS A320 REGISTERED OE-IJZ OPERATED BY EASYJET EUROPE
ON 21 SEPTEMBER 2025 AT NICE**

In the scope of the safety investigation opened after this serious incident, the investigation work has been continuing in order to establish the circumstances of the occurrence and to identify the contributing factors.

In October 2025, the BEA published a [preliminary report](#). This report set out the initial factual information that had been ascertained and the main areas of work.

Since its publication, the investigation work has continued with the collection and analysis of the technical, operational and organisational aspects that might have contributed to the occurrence of the incident. The work has notably covered:

- *analysis of the data from the flight recorders (CVR and FDR) of the two aeroplanes as well as the analysis of the ATM radar system data (radar surveillance and A-SMGCS) and the Nice ANSP (SNA-SE) radiocommunications;*
- *study of the weather conditions;*
- *interviews with the pilots of the flights and the air traffic controllers;*
- *analysis of crew and air traffic controller training and procedures;*
- *study of the RNP A RWY 04 approach and the VPT A RWY 04 approach and in particular, the impact of the 04L and 04R runway lighting on the carrying out of these approaches.*

In order to fully explore this last aspect, the BEA asked for the help of the:

- *Hyères Gendarmerie Air Section (SAG). A night flight was re-enacted in January 2026 in coordination with the Nice ANSP, the Nice airport operator (ACA) and easyJet which provided the BEA with a crew and an aeroplane;*
- *the civil aviation engineering department (STAC) whose laboratory analysed the characteristics of the runway lighting and their impact on how it is perceived.*

Work also covered:

- *European regulations applicable to aerodrome lighting and the procedures for checking it;*
- *design of the approach procedures;*
- *A-SMGCS ground system and its use by the air traffic controllers for the prevention of collisions;*
- *previous occurrences of runway confusion at Nice - Côte d'Azur airport and in the world;*

- *handling of previous occurrences in France by the air operators, the DSNA and the aerodrome operators;*
- *additional on-board or ground systems, in existence or in development, for preventing runway incursions.*

At this stage of the investigation, the information collected has made it possible to specify the sequence of the serious incident and to develop several areas of analysis. The work has notably shown possibilities of improvement concerning:

- *crews' knowledge of certain aerodrome specificities;*
- *regulatory requirements in connection with aerodrome lighting and more specifically, the methods for checking this lighting (on the ground and in flight);*
- *use of the A-SMGCS system;*
- *DSNA's handling of safety occurrences.*

However, these points may evolve according to the results of the work still in progress. The investigation is continuing in order to consolidate the findings, identify the factors that may have contributed to the occurrence and, where appropriate, to word safety recommendations or safety messages designed to prevent a similar occurrence from happening again.