Microlights - 2021

In addition to the European regulatory obligation to open an investigation into all accidents involving a certified aircraft, the BEA introduced a policy in 2015 to also investigate microlight accidents in which people were fatally injured. This study is therefore limited to fatal accidents.

In 2021, the BEA published 17 reports concerning fatal microlight accidents, broken down into class of microlight as follows:

1 accident involving a paramotor (class 1); 1 person fatally injured
2 accidents involving flex-wing microlights (class 2); 2 people fatally injured
10 accidents involving fixed wing microlights (class 3); 12 people fatally injured
3 accidents involving gyroplanes (class 4); 3 people fatally injured
1 accident involving an ultralight helicopter (class 6); 1 person fatally injured

A total of 19 people were fatally injured in the accidents mentioned.

Six topics are particularly dominant in these reports.

1. Insufficient experience

The pilot’s insufficient experience with respect to the context of the flight is frequently identified as a factor contributing to accidents in all aircraft categories. This issue was addressed in the report concerning the accident to 32DH on 31 August 2020 at Condom Valence-sur-Baïse. This report reminds the reader of the Remise en vol (Back to Flying) initiative taken by the FFPLUM (French Microlight Federation), which encourages pilots to contact instructors on a voluntary basis, especially after a long period of inactivity. Flights with an instructor enable both normal and unusual situations to be addressed in order to gain a better understanding of them and to ensure that automatic reflexes acquired during initial training are not lost.

In the accident to 83AGL on 6 August 2020 at Cruis, the pilot lost control of his microlight during an aborted landing at a strip comparable to a mountain landing area. The pilot’s lack of training in mountain flying, and more specifically landing on sloping terrain, may have contributed to his inappropriate decision to take off again. The Pôle National Vol Montagne (French School of Mountain Flying) of the FFPLUM delivers mountain flight training courses for microlight pilots.

This topic was mentioned in four other reports published in 2021:

Lack of recent experience
- 59DAE on 22 May 2020 at Ferté-Bernard
Lack of experience in solo flight after obtaining the microlight pilot certificate or class rating

Seven people were fatally injured in the occurrences mentioned.

2. Medical aspects

Microlight pilots must self-assess their medical fitness to fly. Some pilots may therefore not have anyone to help them monitor changes to their medical fitness to fly. In practice, all pilots, including microlight pilots, can request the advice of a doctor, preferably an aviation doctor. The health questionnaire that pilots affiliated to the FFPLUM must review annually, is a tool pilots can use to assess their need to consult a doctor. In addition, issue 56 of the FFPLUM’s BSV (Flight Safety Bulletin) contains the “MAFORME” personal checklist, which enables pilots to self-assess their fitness to fly before each flight.

Pilot in-flight incapacitation was listed as a probable contributing factor in two accidents:

In two other reports, although the pilot’s state of health was not proven to have contributed to the accident, the health of the pilots led to their fitness to safely conduct the flight being questioned.

Five people were fatally injured in the occurrences mentioned.

3. Taking of risks and non-essential manoeuvres for the management of the flight

This safety topic was frequently raised in safety investigations into fatal accidents, in all aircraft categories. The BEA has addressed this topic on several occasions, in particular in its contribution to the 2018 aviation safety report published by the DGAC and in the 2020 safety lessons concerning light aeroplanes.

In two accidents, the pilot may have had the desire to ‘put on a show’ for people:

Similar occurrence published in 2021: 59DAE on 22 May 2020 at Ferté-Bernard

Four people were fatally injured in the occurrences mentioned.

4. Emergency parachute

Several reports highlighted a late deployment or non-deployment of the emergency parachute, in a context in which this device could have lessened the consequences of the accident.

One example is the report concerning the accident to 13LZ on 7 May 2019 at Saint-Antonin-sur-Bayon. The pilot, who was probably experiencing manoeuvrability difficulties due to a failure of the yaw control, did not deploy the emergency parachute and the microlight collided with the terrain.

During the accident to 59DAE on 22 May 2020 at Ferté-Bernard, the pilot experienced a mid-air rupture of the horizontal tailplane. He deployed the emergency parachute at insufficient height and the microlight collided with the ground.

In the accident to 57AYE on 7 October 2019 at Jumeauville, it was observed that the pilot had not removed the safety pin from the emergency parachute control. In these conditions, faced with an emergency situation, it is unlikely that the pilot considered using the parachute.

Four people were fatally injured in the occurrences mentioned.

In addition, over the period 2019-2021, the BEA was notified of three accidents that did not have fatal consequences, during which the parachute was deployed. The BEA did not conduct an investigation into these three occurrences.

5. Aircraft maintenance

During the accident to 13LZ on 7 May 2019 at Saint-Antonin-sur-Bayon, it is possible that the rupture in flight of a strand on one of the rudder cables restricted the rudder control by hampering the passage of a cable at a pulley. The absence of the condition check of the cables during the 25-hour and 100-hour inspections meant that the operator was not aware of the extent of damage to one of the two rudder cables. Damage observed to a metal cable can sometimes seem insignificant, but its consequences can be major.

In the accident to 59DAE on 22 May 2020 at Ferté-Bernard, the possible presence of play introduced on the elevator trim control linkage during the modification of the engine intake system by the pilot may have generated a flutter phenomenon on the RH elevator.

Two people were fatally injured in these accidents.

This topic was also addressed in the 2020 safety lessons concerning light aeroplanes.

6. Stall in a fixed wing microlight

Loss of control (refer to the 2017 aviation safety report published by the DGAC, losses of control in flight, in light aviation, page 50) is generally the occurrence category with the most fatalities in light aviation. However, it is difficult to draw any generic lessons as this occurrence category encompasses extremely diverse sequences of events in very varied situations. In the reports published in 2021, four situations concerning a stall in a fixed wing microlight were identified. None of these microlights were equipped with a stall warning system. This is not a regulatory requirement. In the absence of certification, it is difficult to determine whether stall warning signs, such as buffeting, were perceptible and whether these would have allowed the pilot to realise the imminence of the loss of control. In the report on the accident to 57AYE on 7 October 2019 at Jumeauville, it was stated in particular that, “In the absence of a stall warning system, it may be difficult to detect the stall, in particular in an unusual situation that can induce stress, and with a microlight presenting few aerodynamic stall warning signs. Compliance with the maximum take-off weight and the balance means that flights are undertaken in a known flight envelope defined by the manufacturer.”

Other stall situations gave rise to reports published in 2021:

Six people were fatally injured in the occurrences mentioned.

Other reports published in 2021

Fixed wing 64ADG on 30 September 2020 at Itxassou: proximity with vultures, evasive manoeuvre, loss of control, collision with terrain, fire, while being towed.

Fixed wings 57YM and 75WQ on 01 September 2018 at Valencisse: collision in cross-country flight with another microlight, loss of control, collision with the ground.

Paramotor 82OT on 5 July 2020 at Pommevic: loss of control during initial climb, collision with a power line, in solo instruction.

Gyroplane 31LI on 5 July 2020 at Sos: rudder struck by main rotor, loss of control in flight, collision with the ground.

Ultralight helicopter 83ARU on 30 November 2019 at Gréoux-les-Bains: loss of doors in flight, loss of control, collision with the ground, fire.

Gyroplane 48BU on 18 January 2021 at Valmeinier: collision with the ground.