In 2024, the BEA published 69 reports regarding light aeroplane accidents (*), 61 of these reports concern aeroplanes with a maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of less than 2.25 t. Twenty-seven of these 69 published reports are solely based on the pilot’s statement (“desktop” type investigation). 

Twenty-four of these accidents resulted in bodily injuries with 16 people fatally injured and 27 people injured or seriously injured.

This thematic review concerns 33 occurrences. Six themes are particularly dominant in these reports.

(*) Two of these reports concern occurrences while towing a glider ( F-BTBC/F-CBLG combination and F-HIGM/F-CHIN ) combination). These two occurrences are included in the 2024 glider annual review. For two other occurrences ( accidents to F-GRPN and to F-HSLE ), the information collected during the investigation tends to point to a possible deliberate act on the part of the pilots. They will not be discussed in this review.

Wreckage of F-BUSU after the accident on 27 May 2023 at Tarbes-Laloubère (Source: BEA)

1. Consequences of mechanical malfunctions

This theme has already been covered in the 2021, 2022 and 2023 reviews and its recurrence is confirmed in 2024.

1.1 Engine failure or reduction in engine power

In seven of the occurrences, the pilots were confronted with a reduction in engine power and even an engine shutdown obliging them to carry out a forced landing or to ditch. Four of these occurrences were due to fuel management or fuel load problems. The FFA has published a Practical Rules document concerning the fuel estimate, “Devis Carburant “ in connection with this.

The accident to F-BPIR on 4 December 2023 at Villejuif illustrates this theme: in descent towards Toussus-le-Noble, in the cloud layer, the fuel system of each of the two engines unprimed due to the exhaustion of fuel in the auxiliary fuel tanks. The two engines no longer provided power. The instructor then took the controls and tried to restart the RH engine without selecting a fuel tank containing fuel.

During the accident to F-BUSU on 27 May 2023 at Tarbes-Laloubère, the fuel system unprimed and the pilot had to deal with a loss of engine power. The aeroplane collided with trees. When the fuel system unprimes on an engine in idle, it is difficult for a pilot to detect it. On final, the pilot may have little time left to act. A good practice is to select, during the preparation for the arrival, a fuel tank containing a sufficient quantity of fuel. The pilot, who mainly carried out flights of a short duration, was no longer familiar with the management of fuel spread between tanks and the use of the fuel selector.

Similar occurrences published in 2024: 

• accident to F-BXAM on 7 June 2022 at Puna’auia: Engine shutdown during descent after parachute drop, ditching in a lagoon, in instruction;

• accident to G-ZIGI on 12 July 2022 at Niort: Engine shutdown in cruise due to fuel exhaustion in left tank, off airfield forced landing (desktop investigation);

• accident to F-GMOU on 10 July 2022 off the coast of Ile de Ré: Engine failure in cruise, ditching;

• accident to 9H-MDJ on 19 December 2022 at Roura: Engine failure, forced landing;

• accident to F-PHRC on 27 May 2023 at Montans: Missed approach, loss of control, collision with ground. The investigation was able to show a failure of the propeller pitch control which very probably prevented the propeller from changing to the full fine pitch setting, thus degrading the aeroplane’s climb performance. 

One person was fatally injured and six people were injured including one person seriously injured in the occurrences mentioned above. It should be noted, however, that for several occurrences the people on board were not injured, despite the high energy level at impact.

1.2 Technical failure (excluding powerplant)
 

In eight occurrences, pilots had to deal with technical failures on their aeroplane.

Although pilots are trained to handle certain known failures (loss of engine power, electrical failure), an unknown failure will surprise them and will be difficult to understand, thus considerably increasing their workload. This can impair their ability to set priorities and compromise the monitoring of flight parameters. 

The report concerning the accident to F-HHOP on 2 August 2020 at Arras-Roclincourt describes a loss of control when joining the aerodrome circuit. This was the result of the asymmetric flap extension, linked to the fatigue failure of the left flap control. The pilot probably neither detected nor understood the change in the aeroplane’s behaviour due to this failure. The height at which the asymmetry probably appeared gave the pilot little time to understand and react.

The report concerning the serious incident to F-OOOO on 18 February 2022 at Saintes – Terre-de-Haut describes a failure of an aileron control cable fitting, very probably as a result of stress corrosion cracking in a warm, humid and salt-laden environment. This failure prevented the pilot from controlling RH roll. The pilot and passenger, both experienced, were able to diagnose the situation in time and adopt a landing strategy. The report contains contributing factors concerning the publication, visibility and watch for information bulletins and airworthiness certificates issued by the authorities.

It is difficult for a pilot to manage a flight control malfunction if he has not been trained to do so. It could therefore be useful to consider and discuss the actions to be taken in such a case, during initial training or recurrent training flights. However, there is no question of improvising such situations in flight if no recovery manoeuvre is recommended by the manufacturer. Depending on the situation, awareness training can be carried out in flight or on the ground. Above all, it must be adapted to the aeroplane used by the pilot.

Other occurrences related to the theme, giving rise to reports published in 2024: 

• accident to HB-PNP on 23 July 2020 at Bâle-Mulhouse aerodrome: In-flight fire, emergency landing. 

During the flight, the ammeter’s abnormally high indication corresponding to the maximum mark of the ammeter and more than 30 A higher than the normal values was not interpreted by the pilot and passengers as a sign of an electrical failure (overload);

• accident to F-HYHB on 7 March 2023 at Biscarrosse - Parentis seaplane base: Rupture of forward float interconnecting strut during water landing, in instruction. 

The investigation found that the float maintenance programme was probably not adequate for the ATO’s operations, characterised by a large number of water landing cycles During the flight, the instructor and the student pilot did not associate the student pilot’s difficulties in controlling the flight path with a possible equipment fault;

• serious incident to F-HERA on 7 June 2023 at Montluçon – Guéret: Shattering of canopy during aerobatic manoeuvres. 

The almost total loss of the properties of the adhesive between the canopy and the frame junction resulted in the canopy adhesive failing. After the canopy had shattered, the pilot checked that the controls were effective and the condition of the elevator, he then flew an adapted circuit and landed. Several contributing factors linked with maintenance were identified;

• accident to F-HDGB on 27 September 2023 at Montpellier-Méditerranée airport: Damage to nose gear during fourth attempt to land, rejected landing, in supervised solo flight;

• accident to F-GUXO on 7 January 2024 at Vichy: Collision with ground, at end of downwind leg.

  In this accident, for an undetermined reason, it seems that the pilot was forced to make an emergency landing;

• accident to F-BVLI on 21 August 2024 at Sauviac: Strong vibrations in cruise, controlled engine shutdown, emergency landing (desktop investigation).

Four people were fatally injured and two people were injured in the occurrences mentioned above.

2. Non-stabilised approaches, management of flare 

A stabilised approach generally ensures an accurate and safe landing. The approach is considered stabilised when the aeroplane is configured for landing, the flight path is centred on the runway, the aeroplane is on the approach slope heading towards the aiming point, the airspeed is stable and in line with the defined approach speed, and only slight attitude and roll corrections are required. 

In the report concerning the serious incident to F-GUXI on 20 January 2024 at Saint-Cyr-l’École, the pilot flew over the motorway at a height of four metres and the LH main landing gear very probably struck a lorry which was on the runway axis and heading north on the A12 motorway. The pilot’s insufficient monitoring of the approach slope on final and the aiming point were considered to be contributing factors.

At the end of the approach, the landing and in particular, the flare, are a critical flight phase. The piloting technique associated with the flare depends on the conditions of the day (aerology, weight and balance, etc.), the manner in which the flight path is defined before touchdown, the characteristics of the aeroplane and the pilot’s expertise in this technique. 

The DSAC has produced a document regarding the stabilised approach-touchdown transition. 

Other reports published in 2024 illustrating this theme:

• accident to N229GC on 28 December 2022 at Barcelonnette aerodrome: Non-stabilised approach, bounces, go-around, collision with vegetation, fire.

  The approach was continued although it was not stabilised, the approach slope (15%) and the speed (35 kt above the recommended speed) were excessive;

• accident to F-GGJS on 19 May 2023 at Cosne-sur-Loire aerodrome: Missed flare, rejected landing, loss of control, collision with fence;

• accident to F-HDYN on 8 July 2023 at Lognes – Emerainville aerodrome: Balked landing, flight on the backside of the power curve, collision with obstacles situated after the end of the runway, during a local flight for remuneration;

• accident to F-GSBN on 14 June 2024 at Chartres-Champhol aerodrome during which the aeroplane veered off the runway when power was increased during a touch-and-go (desktop investigation);

• serious incident to F-HGPR on 6 August 2024 at La Rochelle: Continuation of a non-stabilised approach, bounced landing, loss of control, go-around, runway veer-off, near collision with obstacles.

Two reports published in 2024 concern occurrences in connection with the management of the flare during a solo instruction flight: 

• accident to F-HMRZ on 28 February 2023 at Tours Val de Loire: Bounced landing, failure of nose gear, in solo instruction;

• accident to F-HDGB on 27 September 2023 at Montpellier-Méditerranée airport. 

The Solo and Supervision theme was identified in the 2022 light aeroplane review. The DSAC has published a guide for supervising solo flights.

One person was fatally injured and five people were injured including three seriously injured in the occurrences mentioned above.

It should also be noted that twenty desktop investigation reports published in 2024 refer to loss of control on the ground, runway excursions, hard landings during the flare or landing, with no physical injuries.

3. Rejected or balked landings

This theme has already been identified in the 2020 light aeroplane review.

When a pilot is confronted with an unexpected situation during the landing (long flare, bounce, lateral swerve), as mentioned in the above section, they may have to quickly decide, in a dynamic situation, between continuing the landing with the risk of damaging the aeroplane or taking off again.

The study of previous occurrences shows that the landing accidents with the most serious consequences in terms of injuries and material damage occur, above all, during go-arounds performed with insufficient control of the aeroplane. On the other hand, the accidents which occurred on continuing the landing rarely led, on light aeroplanes, to serious or fatal injuries, although they did result in material damage. Several of the accidents mentioned in the previous section, “Non-stabilised approaches, management of flare”, are directly linked to poorly controlled rejected or balked landings: N229GC, F-HDYN, F-GGJS, F-HGPR, F-GSBN.

During initial or recurrent training, it is important to mention the various aircraft flight mechanics in play during a rejected or balked landing. It is also essential to mention all the threats to be taken into account in order to decide whether it is preferable to reject rather than continue the landing.

In two of these accidents (F-HDYN and F-GGJS), the aeroplane stayed on the backside of the power curve. The pilot unintentionally staying on the backside of the power curve on take-off is a recurring theme and has already been discussed in the 2022 light aeroplane review.

If a missed approach is decided on and carried out at a reasonable height, the risks associated with a non-stabilised approach can be avoided. Several documents are available on this subject:

• the DSAC has written an article and a document describing the actions, objectives, stakes and assessment criteria in connection with a go-around; 

• the FFA “training” and “prevention - safety” commissions have also published a document, Practical Rules - Go-around;

• the ENAC flight instructor guide sets out various procedures and practices for a missed approach (from page 173, section 16).

One person was fatally injured and five people were injured including three seriously injured in the occurrences mentioned above.

4. Pressure caused by the carriage of passengers or the context of the flight, get-home-itis

Several accident reports published in 2024 address the context in which the flight took place. Private pilots may be unprepared for the constraints arising from flights where they have to take charge of passengers that they do not know. The latter may expect a high level of service for a service they have paid for. The extra workload linked to a commentary of the flight or stress associated with the desire to carry out the flight can degrade the pilot's performance. For some accidents, it has not been possible to determine whether or not the particular flight context contributed to the decisions taken by the pilot.

Reports published in 2024 illustrating particular flight contexts:

• accident to N9190X on 14 September 2022 at Amiens-Glisy aerodrome: Stall on short final, hard landing, during a passenger transport flight for remuneration. 

The intervention of a passenger during one of the attempted approaches and the improvised crew cooperation with the owner in the RH seat may have adversely affected the pilot during the approach or encouraged him to continue with the landing at Amiens aerodrome in weather conditions which very probably did not permit the landing;

• accident to N229GC on 28 December 2022 at Barcelonnette aerodrome: Non-stabilised approach, bounces, go-around, collision with vegetation, fire.

This occurrence has been mentioned in the above sections. It was a shared-cost flight; 

• accident to F-HPRE on 30 January 2023 at La Drenne: Collision with a power line in cruise, main landing gear ripped off. 

The pilot and the instructor undertook a flight in adverse weather conditions for a flight under visual flight rules. The purpose of the flight was to both run-in the engine which had been recently overhauled and provide refresher training for the pilot with an instructor; 

• accident to F-HDYN on 8 July 2023 at Lognes – Emerainville aerodrome: Balked landing, flight on the backside of the power curve, collision with obstacles situated after the end of the runway, during a local flight for remuneration.

This occurrence has been mentioned in the above sections. The operating context exposed the pilot, for a large number of flights, to the risks and constraints associated with the carriage of passengers and providing a commercial service, even though she only had experience as a private pilot;

• accident to F-GABZ on 23 October 2023 on Saint-Quentin - Roupy aerodrome: Runway overrun on take-off in the scope of an introductory flight.

Likewise, the determination to arrive at destination (get-home-itis) can distort the risk assessment made at departure and make the decision to divert or turn around all the more difficult as the destination gets closer.

Once in flight and confronted with adverse weather conditions for the continuation of the flight, a diversion or even a precautionary landing are solutions which generally lead to a positive outcome. However, each pilot must be aware of the difficulties that may exist in envisaging this replanning when the situation has already deteriorated: stress, fatigue or the pilot’s concerns (notably his motivations or the constraints which he has fixed himself) are all factors which can affect the pilot’s capacity of discernment and the accuracy of his actions.

The BEA discussed this theme in its 2022 light aeroplane review and in more detail in the 2021 review. The FFA has published a Practical Rules document concerning get-home-itis and obstinacy.

Three accident reports published in 2024 illustrate this theme:

• accident to F-GMXY on 15 August 2023 at Lavau-sur-Loire: Loss of external visual references, loss of control, collision with surface of water.

The aeroplane very probably entered the cloud layer and the pilot lost external visual references which in all likelihood, led to him experiencing spatial disorientation;

• accident to F-PJEA on 16 September 2023 at Prévenchères: Loss of external visual references, collision with ground.

Although the pilot was aware that the weather conditions were degraded and had prepared to delay his flight, he undertook it nevertheless and lost visual references in cruise in a mountainous area. 

The pilot had held the instrument flight rating between 1993 and 2004. He also knew that the weather conditions were good at the end of the planned route. These factors may have delayed his decision to turn back;

• accident to F-GUXO on 7 January 2024 at Vichy: This occurrence has been mentioned in the above sections. The pilot, accompanied by a passenger who was also a pilot, was carrying out a short flight as part of a “Father Christmas” day for the children of flying club members.

Seven people were fatally injured and six people were injured including three seriously injured in all the occurrences mentioned above.

5. Role of instructor

The instructor plays a central role in flight safety, both during pilot training and during recurrent training or proficiency check flights. Not only does he provide (practical or theoretical) technical knowledge, but he also contributes to shaping the behaviour of future pilots. The impression the instructor leaves on his or her students is decisive, and the instructor's behaviour is often seen as an example of how to behave. 

Three investigation reports published in 2024 show that instructors can settle into a certain routine. This can lead them to underestimate the threats associated with their activity:

• the report concerning the accident to F-HFMO on 31 May 2021 at Tours - Val de Loire describes an engine failure at take-off exercise carried out by the instructor at an insufficient height (80 ft) and speed (67 kt) in the scope of an instructor standardisation flight. An unsafe exercise shown in instruction contributes to the spread of dangerous practices;

• the report concerning the accident to F-HPRE, already mentioned, describes a collision with a power line in cruise and the main landing gear being torn off. The pilot, who had a small amount of recent experience, wanted some refresher training with the on-board instructor. The decision to undertake the flight, to continue the flight in adverse weather conditions for VFR and the mutual overconfidence between the pilot and the instructor may have contributed to the accident;

• the report concerning the accident to F-BPIR, already mentioned, shows that, despite his vast piloting experience, the instructor did not adequately supervise the pilot in training’s critical actions, in particular the latter’s fuel management. Furthermore, the ATO (where the instructor was accountable manager, training manager and the safety management system manager) had not assessed the risks associated with simplifying fuel management in the school’s procedures. 

Three people were injured in the occurrences mentioned.

6. Mid-air collisions 

Although the risk of a bird strike is assessed as small based on the frequency and severity of the recorded occurrences, in 2024 the BEA published two accident reports concerning this subject: 

• accident to F-GKQE on 29 July 2022 on Biarritz - Pays Basque airport: Bird strike on final, in instruction;

• accident to F-GJXO on 4 March 2024 at Béziers: Bird strike while holding, in instruction.

The DGAC has published a technical information bulletin regarding bird strikes in general aviation. Information (section ENR 5.6 of part 2 En Route) regarding bird migration is also available in the eAIP of the AIS.

The mid-air collision between a helicopter (F-HEGT) and an aeroplane (F-AYVV) on 8 February 2024 at Cozy is a reminder of the weakness of the "see and avoid" rule alone as a means of preventing mid-air collisions for pilots flying under VFR. The presence of electronic aircraft detection equipment on board both aircraft might have helped the pilots identify the other aircraft. In the scope of the investigation into the fatal collision between an aeroplane (F-BXEU) and a microlight (37AHH) on 10 October 2020 at Loches, the BEA addressed a safety recommendation to EASA in order to promote the “out signal” interoperability of electronic conspicuity systems.

The report concerning the accident to F-BSPK on 24 September 2023 at Calais-Marck concerns the collision with kite lines in the aerodrome circuit during an introductory flight.

One person was injured in the occurrences covered by reports published in 2024. 

Others reports published in 2024: 

• accident to HB-KFS on 8 April 2023 at Saulieu-Liernais aerodrome: Runway veer-off during take-off, strike with pedestrian. 

The effects of alcohol very probably contributed to the pilot and the pedestrian poorly assessing the risk;

• accident to F-HFIK on 17 June 2023 at Pignans: Asymmetric stall, spin, post-impact fire.

The pilot, accompanied by two passengers, was carrying out a local flight. The information collected during the investigation seems to suggest that the reductions in speed observed several times during the flight and shortly before the loss of control were the result of deliberate actions and could correspond to sightseeing of points of interest or specific manoeuvres in the vertical profile. 

Reminder of themes in previous years

2023

1. Insufficient knowledge or experience for flying in mountainous areas
2. Staying on the backside of the power curve during take-off
3. Non-stabilized approaches
4. Consequences of mechanical malfunctions
5. Pressure induced by the carrying of passengers and the group effect

2022

1. Insufficient knowledge or experience for flying in mountainous areas
2. Get-home-itis
3. Loss of control
4. Solo flight and supervision
5. Consequences of mechanical malfunctions

2021

1. Services for third parties
2. Get-home-itis, pressure caused by the carrying of passengers and the ‘group effect’
3. Incomplete flight preparation
4. Insufficient experience
5. Insufficient knowledge or experience for mountain flying
6. Aircraft maintenance/Engine malfunctions
7. Non-essential manoeuvres for the management of the flight
8. Inadequate fuel management

2020

1. Lack of recent experience
2. Taking of risks and non-essential manoeuvres for the management of the flight
3. Rejected landing and go-around
4. Aircraft maintenance
    

[1] Two of these reports concern occurrences while towing a glider (F-BTBC/F-CBLG combination and F-HIGM/F-CHIN) combination). These two occurrences are included in the 2024 glider annual review. For two other occurrences (accidents to F-GRPN and to F-HSLE), the information collected during the investigation tends to point to a possible deliberate act on the part of the pilots. They will not be discussed in this review.