Microlights - 2023

In addition to the European regulatory obligation to open an investigation into all accidents involving a certified aircraft, the BEA introduced a policy in 2015, to also investigate microlight accidents in which people were fatally injured. This review is thus limited to fatal accidents.

In 2023, the BEA published 25 reports regarding fatal microlight accidents which occurred between 2020 and 2023, broken down into class of microlight as follows:

• four occurrences concerning paramotors (class 1) identified as 60ADX, 36UU, 68AKY and 78ASI;
• one occurrence concerning a flex-wing microlight (class 2) identified as 77BIQ;
• eighteen occurrences concerning fixed-wing microlights (class 3) identified as 59DUJ, 21AJD, 78XZ, 974LY, 88PP, 27ADS, 76PV, 73TH, 43YH, 63ACL, 23DI, 57BPJ, 63ASS, 12DM, 988FC, 67ZL, 37AHH and W42SF;
• two occurrences concerning gyroplanes (class 4) identified as 05TD and 21AGP.

In seven investigations, the circumstances that led to the accident remain uncertain due to a lack of factual information. Nevertheless, it was observed on several occasions that the aerology or the pilot's medical history may have been possible contributory factors, without it being possible to formally establish a link with the accident. It should be noted that in two of these investigations, no element that could have contributed to the accident was identified.

A total of 35 people were fatally injured in these 25 accidents. Seven topics are particularly dominant in these reports.

1. Airframe parachute

This topic has already been covered in the

2021 microlight review

The accident to 59DUJ on 19 June 2020 at Mortemer, is a reminder of how it is difficult for a pilot, faced with an emergency situation, to realise that s/he needs to activate the airframe parachute without delay. In the report, it is specified that “Despite the stance taken by the pilot in favour of the parachute and its activation, and the elements collected during the investigation which seem to show that he was aware of the loss of control, the airframe parachute was not activated.” Prior to the use of the parachute to mitigate the consequences of the loss of control, several factors that may have led the pilot to operate in adverse weather conditions for VFR flight were identified during the investigation. In particular, the report mentions the pilot’s strong desire to reach his destination, the FIC agent's failure to detect the difficulties encountered by the pilot of 59DUJ and the absence of meteorological information which could have allowed the Paris Info agent to provide the pilot of 59DUJ with a flight information service adapted to the actual and future meteorological conditions in the Paris FIC airspace The BEA issued a safety recommendation with respect to the organisation of the flight information service and assistance for VFR flights in difficulty.

Another example is the accident to 43YH on 3 September 2022 at Noron l’Abbaye. During the cross-country flight, the pilot found himself in weather conditions incompatible with VFR flight and loss control of his microlight. The airframe parachute was not deployed.

In the mid-air collision between 37AHH and F-BXEU on 10 October 2020 at Loches, the microlight pilot activated the airframe parachute. However, it did not deploy correctly. The investigation found that the cables connecting the airframe parachute to the structure of the microlight were assembled in a way which did not withstand the loads specified by the manufacturer. The BEA issued a safety recommendation addressed to the manufacturer, and the DGAC issued an airworthiness directive requiring a modification to the parachute attachment system.

Although in the above event the activation of the parachute did not save the occupants of the microlight, several other occurrences have shown the effectiveness of such a system. In 2023, the BEA was notified of two accidents in which microlights suffered in-flight wing failure.
The activation of the parachute mitigated the consequences of these two accidents, which did not result in serious bodily injury.
 

2. Group effect

In the accident to 21AJD on 21 August 2021 at Courcelles, the microlight collided with a power line during a three-microlight cross-country flight. The investigation found that the pilots had not prepared this cross-country flight and that the flight path chosen was based on one of the group member’s knowledge of the route. During a group excursion, the risk assessment can be partial or even implicit. It is not necessarily individualised at the outset nor does it necessarily take account of each person's skills or habits (knowledge of the route, low-level flying, etc.). Subsequently, during the flight, risk awareness may be diluted.

Two other reports published in 2023 concern accidents which occurred during a two-aircraft cross-country flight. These two accidents arose in adverse weather conditions for a VFR flight. The pilots’ decision to undertake the flight might have been influenced by the fact that the other pilots took off before them.

• Accident to 43YH on 3 September 2022 at Noron L’Abbaye: Flight in weather conditions incompatible with flight under VFR rules, collision with the ground.
• Accident to 76PV on 14 July 2022 at Saint-Valéry-Vittefleur: Loss of control after take-off, collision with ground.

Five people were fatally injured in the occurrences mentioned.

3. Services for third parties

Three reports published in 2023 concern commercial passenger services. This activity is characterised by the exposure of third parties to the risks inherent in non-commercial light aviation and by an increased workload for the pilot.

In the accident to 77BIQ on 20 August 2022 at Meaux-Esbly, the pilot lost control of the flex-wing microlight in initial climb after tumbling. Insufficient concentration on the part of the pilot, to the detriment of monitoring the flight parameters during this critical phase of the flight, may have contributed to this accident. This possible lack of concentration could have been linked to a routine effect due to the repetition of sightseeing flights on that day.

In the mid-air collision between 37AHH and F-BXEU, the pilots’ ability to monitor the presence of other aircraft in the vicinity may have been limited due to their attention being focused on the château. The desire to satisfy passengers to the detriment of monitoring the outside environment may have contributed to this collision. Electronic conspicuity systems are a promising solution to supplement the current safety principles for the avoidance of mid-air collisions. In this respect, the BEA has recommended that EASA promote “out signal” interoperability of electronic conspicuity systems, for example through the development of an exchange-format standard and the allocation of a dedicated aeronautical frequency in order to promote safety.

Lastly, the investigation into the accident to 974LY on 10 October 2021 at Saint-Paul de la Réunion found that the pilot gradually reduced his height overhead the terrain, and more generally his margins in relation to the terrain, to a point where flight safety was compromised. The commercial context of the flight and the desire to satisfy his passenger may have incited him to do this. Furthermore, the pilot, perhaps occupied with satisfying his passenger, probably paid insufficient attention to the management of the flight and the monitoring of the flight path.

The absence of a specific operating framework for commercial microlight flights may contribute to this type of accident. In response to recommendations made by the BEA, the DGAC has undertaken to publish an order aimed at providing a framework for these local revenue flights in microlights.

Nine people were fatally injured in the occurrences mentioned.

This topic has already been covered in the

2021 light aeroplane thematic review

 4. Risk taking - Non-essential manoeuvres for the management of the flight

This topic has regularly been addressed by the BEA. In 2018, the BEA contributed to the Report on aviation safety published by the DGAC with a study on risk-taking in light aviation, when performing dangerous, non-essential manoeuvres for normal flight management. The study identified a number of factors that contribute to risk-taking, including wanting to put on a form of show for third parties on the ground, or even for the passenger, or the search for thrills.

The pilot of the microlight identified 21AJD expressed his enthusiasm several times on the frequency, indicating his state of exaltation. The height at which he was flying along the route meant that his safety margins in relation to obstacles were reduced. He also descended to, in his words, say hello to people on the ground. During this manoeuvre, he did not perceive the power line or did so too late and was unable to avoid it. In the report regarding this accident, it is stated that, “When flight safety is not based on a “no-go” (in this case the flight height), it is the pilot’s awareness of the risks that will ensure that certain safety margins are complied with. If the pilot does not fly regularly, s/he will not have internalized the risks and associated limits. Once a “no-go” is ignored, there are no more limits. Thus from the moment the pilot flies below the standard flight height, there is nothing to hold him/her back from descending even further.” 

The investigation into the accident to the paramotor identified 68AKY on 18 June 2022 at Saint Rémy, was not able to determine the cause for the loss of control which led to the collision with the ground. However, the very low height of the manoeuvres did not offer the pilot the necessary safety margins to deal with an unexpected event.

Lastly, as mentioned in the previous topic, the pilot of 974LY was flying close to the terrain on flight paths offering small safety margins. As a consequence, when the microlight lost height during a manoeuvre close to a point of interest, the pilot was unable to avoid collision with the terrain.

Four people were fatally injured in the occurrences mentioned.

5. Medical aspects

Microlight pilots benefit from a fairly unrestrictive regulatory framework, but like all pilots, they are exposed to the stresses inherent in carrying out an aerial activity (acceleration, hypoxia, etc.). If they do not ask whether their state of health is compatible with the planned flight, pilots may be unaware that the safety of the flight is at stake and that they and their passengers are exposing themselves to a major risk. In the interests of prevention and accountability, FFPLUM-licensed pilots are invited each year, to complete a medical self-assessment questionnaire for their sport. In addition, a federation doctor is available to FFPLUM members to examine with them, the aspects of their medical condition relating to flying.

On 7 February 2022, the pilot of the paramotor identified 60ADX lost control of his wing after a flight time of five minutes. The 73-year-old pilot flew regularly and had substantial flight experience. However, the pilot’s relatives indicated that in the months preceding the accident, he was tired. They had observed that at times he was “absent” and had a tendency to forget things. An anatomical-pathological examination revealed a pathology that could have impaired the cardiac function spontaneously or in the event of stress along with a loss of neurons in the cerebral cortex, which could explain the cognitive problems observed by the relatives. All pilots, including microlight pilots, can seek advice from a doctor to help them assess their medical fitness to fly and adapt their flying if necessary.

In the accident to 27ADS on 8 March 2022 at Bernard Saint-Marin, the pilot lost control of his microlight close to the runway from where he had taken off. The 79-year-old pilot was suffering from coronary artery disease complicated by fibrosis of the heart muscle. He had had one or more heart attacks and was being monitored by a cardiologist. The pathological examination indicated that it is possible that the pilot experienced another cardiac event during the flight. At each annual renewal of his membership with the FFPLUM, the pilot completed the online health questionnaire (QS-Sport), answering "no" to all the sections. The federation doctor indicated that he was not contacted by the pilot.

The report on the accident to the paramotor identified 78ASI on 1 July 2022 indicated that, "The fact that the student pilot had not eaten since the previous day, associated with a possible state of fatigue following a bad night, might have impaired his ability to withstand the accelerations induced by the start of the spiral dive, and might have contributed to his failure to react to exit the turn.”

In addition to any identified pathology, it is also important for pilots to assess their physical and physiological condition on the day before embarking on a flight. For example, the FFPLUM editorial BSV n°56 includes a personal health checklist “MAFORME”.

In three other reports, although it was not proven that the pilots' state of health contributed to the accident, their medical condition led to questions about their fitness to carry out the flight safely:

• Accident to 88PP on 16 October 2021 at Beaune-Challanges: Loss of control in initial climb, collision with ground.
• Accident to 57BPJ on 22 September 2022 at Dieuze-Guéblange: Collision with vegetation then with the ground, post-impact fire. The pilot was 77 years old.
• Accident to 05TD on 8 March 2022 at Guillestre: Loss of control in flight in turbulent conditions, collision with ground, fire.

For some of these events, pilots need to be aware of and pay particular attention to the consequences of ageing, which affects, in particular, the pilot’s vision, psychomotor responses and state of health. The pilots concerned need to be aware of the effects of ageing and the limits of the compensation mechanisms they can implement.

Eight people were fatally injured in the occurrences mentioned.

This topic was covered in the

2021 microlight review

6. Management of aerological conditions, turbulence

Microlights, being lightweight, can be particularly vulnerable to aerological conditions, especially turbulence. An erroneous assessment of or insufficient consideration given to the aerological conditions during the take-off or landing phases can lead to a significant reduction in the safety margins in relation to obstacles or lead to loss of control when the aircraft is at low speed and close to the ground.

Flight in a mountainous terrain has its own special characteristics, in particular complex and changing aerology. In the accident to 63ACL on 31 December 2022 at Volvic, the pilot was flying downwind of terrain and lost control of the microlight in an area of disturbed and turbulent air. The pilot’s incomplete mental picture of the aerological situation may have resulted in him being in this area of turbulence which he had not been aware of. In the accident to 73TH on 28 July 2022 on Val Thorens mountain airstrip, the pilot probably experienced downdrafts and turbulence during the final approach. He was obliged to abort the approach and the microlight collided with the ground while the pilot was trying to break away facing the terrain. On 8 March 2022 at Guillestre, the loss of control of the gyroplane identified 05TD occurred a few minutes after take-off in complex aerological conditions. The accident site was located in an area of moderate to fairly strong turbulence at ground level and in the very low layers. This turbulence was due partly to gusts at ground level and partly to updrafts and downdrafts linked to the surrounding terrain.

The loss of control in initial climb to 12DM on 8 March 2022 at Aix-Les Milles aerodrome took place in a flight context that presented several difficulties. Firstly, the pilot was carrying out his first flight after major modifications to the microlight that were likely to alter its behaviour in flight, and secondly, he took off in an aerology that was unfavourable for a flight test.

In the accident to 68AKY on 18 June 2022, the pilot lost control of his paramotor while he was flying at a low height over a field. The stormy conditions may have contributed to the loss of control. The very low height of the manoeuvres did not offer the pilot the necessary safety margins to deal with an unexpected event.

The loss of control to 36UU on 25 June 2022 at Savines-le-Lac occurred after the wing collapsed in flight. The local aerological conditions generating severe turbulence along with the trimmers set to meet the needs of the intended slalom flight, but increasing the risk of wing collapse in turbulent conditions may have contributed to this accident.

In the report on the accident to 63ASS on 19 June 2022 at Egletons, the following reminder is given: “The French Aeronautical Federation (FFA) publishes ICARUS sheets, which summarise, for each aerodrome and as a complement to the information published on the VAC charts, the identified threats likely to have an impact on flight safety at local level. These sheets are drawn up based on information provided by local points of contact and are, as far as possible, kept up to date.”

Eight people were fatally injured and one person seriously injured in the occurrences mentioned.

This topic has already been covered in the

2022 microlight

7. Aircraft maintenance

In the accident to the Magni Gyro M24 identified 21AGP on 2 March 2022 at Vaux-Saules, a component in the rotor control system ruptured after a few minutes of flight. As a result of this rupture, movement was unrestricted in the rotor plane, causing a rotor blade to come into contact with the right front section of the cockpit. Given the uniqueness of the event which occurred to 21AGP and the lack of certainty about the sequence of ruptures, the BEA did not issue a safety recommendation. However, although the Magni Gyro flight manual does not include a check of the connection between the control linkage and rotor assembly in the before flight inspection to be carried out by the pilot, it seems appropriate, in view of the findings of this investigation, to suggest that pilots of Magni Gyro gyroplanes visually check the connection between the fork tube and the square pivot.

The accident to 05TD also involved a Magni. A bolt in the rotor control system was very probably lost in flight. This could have resulted in abnormal play, or total or partial separation in flight, making the gyroplane difficult to control or uncontrollable.

Two people were fatally injured in these two occurrences.

This topic has already been covered in the

2021 microlight

Others reports published in 2023

• Accident to 988FC on 18 February 2023 at Païta (New Caledonia): Engine failure, off-airfield forced landing, collision with a bank, fire.
• Accident to 23DI on 26 May 2022 at Guéret-Saint-Laurent: Failure of the left wing in flight, collision with the ground.
  This accident highlights the advantage of working with a federation for the amateur design and build of microlights. As a member of a federation, such as the RSA or the FFPLUM, amateur microlight designers and builders can benefit from support in their actions, thereby optimising safety.
• Accident to W42SF on 25 February 2022 at Roanne-Renaison: Turn-around in initial climb, loss of control at low height, collision with ground.
  During the initial climb, the pilot reported a problem over the frequency, which led him to turn to the left to immediately come back to the runway. The investigation was unable to determine what led the pilot to try to come back to the runway rather than continuing on the extended axis of the runway, where the environment was suitable for a forced landing.

In 2021, the BEA published a study, Reduction in engine power at take-off. The study states that the fatal accidents that occurred in this context have all been the result of a loss of control in flight, and a large proportion of these losses of control occurred during a significant heading change or even during an attempted turn-around.

• Accident to 67ZL on 30 January 2022 at Sedan-Douzy: Loss of control on base leg, collision with ground, fire.
• Accident to 78XZ on 12 September 2021 at Antouillet: Nose-down movement in initial climb, collision with ground, fire.

Reminder of topics in previous years

2021:

• Insufficient experience
• Medical aspects
• Taking of risks and non-essential manoeuvres for the management of the flight
• Airframe parachute
• Aircraft maintenance
• Stall in a fixed wing microlight
   

2022:

•  
• Aircraft maintenance
• Management of aerological conditions
• Attempts to turn around after engine power reduction on take-off
• Stall in a fixed wing microlight