Accident to the Cessna 525A “CitationJet CJ2+” registered D-IULI on 06/06/2018 at La Môle (Var)

Cat. 2 investigation report: simplified-format report, adapted to the circumstances of the occurrence and the investigation stakes.

The pilot, accompanied by a passenger sat in the cockpit, took off at around 12:15 on an IFR flight plan from Figari airport (Corsica), bound for La Môle airport.
At 12:30, during the aeroplane’s descent, the pilot contacted the Nice approach controller and asked for clearance to carry out an approach via point EM. The controller contacted the Nice Info controller by telephone to inform him of the arrival of the aeroplane. After making this phone call, he informed the pilot that there was heavy rain, visibility was four kilometres at the destination airport, and he asked him for his intentions. The pilot replied that he was reducing speed to the minimum and asked for an avoidance heading. The controller accepted and asked him to contact the Nice Info controller.
The latter told the pilot to continue in accordance with the previous clearances and to keep him informed of his intentions. The pilot replied that he was waiting for the showers to finish at La Môle and that he would carry out an approach via point EM. The controller responded by asking him to call back when he was ready to turn towards point EM and asked him to descend to FL60.
A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he had not managed to contact the AFIS officer at La Môle and asked him to tell him when the showers were over. The controller accepted and contacted the La Môle AFIS officer by telephone to ask him to keep him informed of shower developments.
Three minutes later, although he had not received information about weather developments, the pilot asked to turn towards point EM. In the minutes that followed, the pilot asked to change heading several times in order to avoid clouds.
A few minutes later, the pilot indicated that he had point EM in sight. The controller authorized him to carry out a visual approach for runway 24 and then asked him to contact the La Môle AFIS officer.
The latter told the pilot that he was the sole aircraft in the airport circuit, asked him to call back on final approach and gave him the wind conditions.
The pilot carried out a first approach which he aborted as he could not see the runway due to the clouds. He informed the AFIS officer that he was returning to point EM.
Two minutes later, the pilot asked for the visibility on the final path. The AFIS officer told him that visibility was 4 to 5 km, before informing him that he had him in sight and giving him the latest wind conditions.
The aeroplane touched down on the runway 200 m after the runway threshold, at a true airspeed of 136 kt. The pilot set the flaps to the “full ground” position and the spoilers were deployed. The aeroplane reached the taxiway B intersection 13 s later at a true airspeed of 77 kt. It continued its run over the paved strip situated after the end of runway 24 and deviated left. It left the paved surface at a true airspeed of 41 kt and descended into the river situated at the bottom of a small bank. The aeroplane’s nose violently struck the opposite bank.
The pilot managed to evacuate the aeroplane through the emergency exit on the rear right side of the aeroplane. The emergency services then helped the passenger blocked in the cockpit to evacuate the aeroplane.
The aeroplane’s landing distance on a wet runway as defined in the performance tables of the aircraft flight manual was not compatible with the runway length available at La Môle airport.
While preparing the flight, the pilot used the flight file provided by ProAir to determine the landing performances. The landing distance on a wet runway given in this file was the landing distance on a dry runway increased by 15%. The 15% increase for a wet runway can only be used in association with the 60% increase imposed in commercial operation; without this, it may not be appropriate. The result of the calculation, in the present case, was erroneous and less than the value indicated in the aircraft flight manual.
The pilot probably used neither the EFB application to calculate performance nor the flight manual to check this value.
The pilot thus undertook the flight on the basis of erroneous performance values, not knowing that he could not land on this airport if the runway was wet.
Furthermore, during the final approach, the aeroplane’s speed was higher than the approach reference speed and the approach slope was also steeper than the nominal slope, which increased the landing distance.
During the landing run, the aeroplane overran the runway at a speed of 41 kt. The pilot did not manage to stop the plane before it violently struck the obstacles at the end of the runway.
If the pilot had checked the landing distance calculation on the software application installed on the EFB, he would have had the possibility of either applying a factor of 15% or of using the data from the flight manual. The ergonomy of the EFB is misleading because firstly, it gives the impression that the calculation method using the 15% factor can be used in non-commercial operation without the 60% increase applicable for commercial air transport and secondly, the wording “WET RWY - AFM ADVISORY” gives the impression that the AFM data is supplied for information purposes only.
The AFIS officer on duty at the time of the occurrence considered that the runway was not contaminated. He probably did not think it useful to tell the pilot that the runway was wet as the latter had already been warned of heavy rain on the airport during the descent.