Accident to the SCHEMPP HIRTH VENTUS B 166 registered F-CZAN on 25/05/2024 at Compiègne Margny

This is a courtesy translation by the BEA of the Final Report on the Safety Investigation. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French is the work of reference.

Note: the following information is principally based on the pilot’s statement. This information has not been independently validated by the BEA.

1. HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT
The pilot lined up her glider, boarded and got ready for a towed take-off from runway 23, for a local flight. She carried out the before take-off vital actions (CRIS checklist) and indicated to the runway assistant and to the tug pilot that she was ready to take off. The runway assistant raised the wing and held the glider level. The tug pilot applied power, the glider pilot complied with the specific operational instructions for this glider: the flaps are initially set to “-1”, she kept her left hand on the flap control and during the run, she set the flaps to “0”. She looked down to check that on the airspeed indicator, she was approaching 80 km/h and then looked outside. She perceived that the glider was offset to the RH side of the tug plane. She decided to release the cable, moved her left hand from the flap control to the release control, and released the cable. The glider pivoted around its RH wing, rose and then violently struck the runway, with the nose at around 180° to the axis of runway 23. The tug pilot managed to reject his take-off.

2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2.1 Glider information
The glider was substantially damaged: the nose was destroyed up to the pedals, the canopy had separated from the fuselage, the RH elevator had split, the RH wing was very damaged and the trailing edge was delaminated. The club (owner of the glider) indicated that given the damaged, the glider would not be repaired. 

2.2 Pilot information
The 65-year-old pilot held a Sailplane Pilot Licence (SPL) (converted from a French licence obtained in 1982). She had logged a total of 2,200 flight hours including 385 hours on type and 11 flight hours in the 3 months preceding the accident, all on types. She had flown this type of glider since 2005. 

2.3 Statement
2.3.1 Glider pilot statement
The glider pilot indicated that she had not perceived that a wing had touched the ground during the take-off. As she had been taught, she released the cable as soon as she realised that she was substantially off-centre to the tug plane. She then failed to regain control of the glider, which performed a violent U-turn.
2.3.2 Tug pilot statement
The tug pilot indicated that the take-off began nominally. When he checked the glider in the rear view mirror, its wings were level and it was aligned with the tug plane. Then when the speed increased to 80 km/h, he looked in the rear view mirror again and could no longer see the glider. At this point, he felt a substantial tension on the tow cable. He was going to cut the cable by grabbing the cutter control when he saw that the glider pilot had released the cable. He then rejected the take-off and went over to the glider which on turning, was on the axis of runway 05.  
2.3.3 Statement from a pilot near the starter during the accident
A pilot near the glider starter indicated that he saw the combination start the take-off nominally, the glider having its wings level. Then progressively, the glider banked to the RH side until the RH wing came into contact with the ground. The glider then performed a ground loop during which the glider rose before coming into contact with the ground with a steep nose-down attitude.
December 2024