Accident to the Robin DR400-160 registered F-GGQF occured on 21/09/2014 at Vitry-en-Artois (62, France)

This is a courtesy translation by the BEA of the Final Report on the Safety Investigation. As accurate
as the translation may be, the original text in French is the work of reference.

1 - HISTORY OF FLIGHT

The pilot took off at 15 h 25 from runway 03 from Lens Bénifontaine aerodrome (62) to go and pick up three friends at Vitry-en-Artois and make a leisure flight. After about ten minutes of flight, he landed on runway 30 at Vitry-en-Artois aerodrome. He took off again at about 16 h 00 from the same runway accompanied by the three passengers and planned to overfly the coast and land at Dieppe (76) for a break before returning to Vitry-en-Artois. During the flight, approaching Dieppe, he noticed a deterioration in the visibility conditions and returned directly to Vitry-en-Artois.

The pilot stated that on arrival, he overflew the windsock twice but had difficulties in judging the wind direction. He estimated that the wind strength was about 15 km/h (around 8 kt) from between 250° and 300°. He joined the left hand downwind leg for runway⁽¹⁾ 12. He stated that on the final turn he felt “a gust of wind pushing him down onto the ground”. The aeroplane dropped, banked to the left and pitched nose-down. The pilot reduced the power, put the wings back into a horizontal position and pulled up strongly before the collision with the ground.

3.5 Causes

The accident resulted from a combination of the following factors:

• the decision to undertake the flight after consuming alcohol;
• completion of non-standard circuit patterns with narrow safety margins;
• the habit of shortening flight paths;
• incorrect representation of the wind direction in relation to the direction of the runway which caused the pilot to land with a tailwind component without his being aware of it;
• the inadequate representativeness of the renewal flights, which meant that the club could not discover the build-up of the pilot’s degraded performances;
• the club’s inability, at the time of the event, to enforce its own rule regarding pilots’ recent experience.

4 - RECOMMENDATIONS

Note: In accordance with Article 17.3 of European Regulation (EU) 996/2010 of the European Parliament and Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation, a safety recommendation shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability for an accident, a serious incident or an incident. The addressee of a safety recommendation shall inform the safety investigation authority which issued the recommendation of the actions taken or under consideration, under the conditions described in Article 18 of the aforementioned Regulation.

Taking into account the risk related to alcohol consumption in general aviation As an everyday

consumer product, alcohol does not rouse enough mistrust in terms of the impaired judgement and performance that it produces, especially for alcohol blood levels considered low and which may be reached with the first glass drunk.

In thirteen investigations into general aviation accidents⁽²⁾ that occurred after 1st January 2000, the BEA established that pilots’ alcohol consumption contributed to the event. In four of these accidents the pilot’s blood alcohol level was within the limits for the driver of a land vehicle. In one case, the level remained unknown.

European regulation (EU) n°923/2012 prohibits flying under the influence of alcohol without actually defining this notion. The provisions relating to European regulation (EU) n°965/2012 set the blood alcohol limit at 0.02% for public transport, specialised operations and also for non-commercial flights on complex aircraft. This threshold takes into account physiological data to guarantee a nominal level of performance. Pilots can easily assess their alcohol level by using an electronic breathalyser. However
for a pilot making a non-commercial flight on a non-complex aircraft, the lack of an alcohol limit confers an interpretative and subjective nature to the notion of “being under the influence” of alcohol.

Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

• EASA complete the provisions of EU regulation n°965/2012 concerning non-commercial operations on non-complex aircraft (NCO) through an AMC/GA stating the blood alcohol level beyond which impaired judgement, and the performance that it produces, risks affecting flight safety. [Recommendation FRAN-2015-055]

• In the meantime, that the DGAC carry out an awareness campaign for general aviation pilots on the risks of imbibing alcoholic drinks even if the resulting blood alcohol level seems minimal and inconsequential in everyday life. [Recommandation FRAN-2015-056]

⁽¹⁾Unpaved 900 x 100 m runway, LDA 837 m.
⁽²⁾These accidents caused the death of four people.