Accident to the Robin DR401-155 CD registered F-GNXT on 25/08/2017 at Vinon (Var)

Returning from a cross-country flight, the F-GNXT pilot, arriving in sight of the Vinon aerodrome from the south-east, advised on the A/A frequency that he was two minutes from being overhead; he then arrived over the aerodrome at a height of 1,300 ft in order to inspect the field. He observed that there were people, vehicles and gliders present on runway 16 behind the tug strips. As it seemed that the glider activity had not yet started, he positioned himself in order to begin the left-hand downwind leg to land on runway 28.

When he was at a height of around 800 ft at the beginning of the downwind leg for runway 28, a tug plane towing a glider (combination) took off from runway 16. In the middle of the downwind leg, the F-GNXT pilot saw the combination climbing in his 10 o’clock below him. Believing that the aircraft were on conflicting flight paths, he immediately reminded the starter and tug pilot on the A/A frequency of his presence in the aerodrome circuit for aeroplane runway 28. He received no reply. The combination then made a right-hand climbing turn.

When the F-GNXT pilot turned into the base leg, the pilot of a second tug plane towing a glider took off from runway 16.

When F-GNXT arrived in the last turn at a height of around 400 ft, the first combination were still performing a right-hand climbing turn south of runway 28 at a height of 600 ft to head northwards to the glider release sector situated to the north-east of the aerodrome. The second combination crossed runway 28 and were at a height of 120 ft also in a right-hand climbing turn. A motor glider was aligned on runway 20 and the pilot was about to take off.

On coming out of the last turn, the F-GNXT pilot saw the second combination climbing below him. He hesitated going around, momentarily interrupted the descent and then decided to continue the approach by offsetting his aiming point to the right to land on the unpaved runway. As the aeroplane was high on the approach slope, the pilot corrected the slope, configured full flaps and completely reduced thrust. He was slow to flare and was surprised by the first bounce of the aeroplane.

The aeroplane bounced a second time then, on the third contact with the runway, the nose landing gear failed and the propeller came into contact with the ground. The aeroplane came to a halt on the unpaved part of runway 28, just before the intersection with runway 02/20. The motor glider, which had taken off from runway 20, then flew over F-GNXT.

On continuing a non-stabilized approach with an approach slope which was too steep and a speed in final which was too high, the management of the flare was tricky. The late flare was followed by a hard touchdown and then a first bounce. The pilot probably eased the stick forward after the bounce, generating a nose-down attitude conducive to a second bounce and then the failure of the nose landing gear on the third contact with the runway. Never having been confronted with a bounced landing and not knowing the actions to be carried out in such a case, he may have made inappropriate inputs on the controls, leading to a hard landing and the failure of the nose landing gear.

The pilot’s decision to extend the base leg and offset the initially planned aiming point to manage what he considered to be an insufficient gap with the second combination, destabilized the final approach. This shift in attention may have occurred to the detriment of the monitoring of the flight parameters, resulting in a landing being carried out with an excessive speed and slope.

The pilot joined the aerodrome circuit without realizing that the gliding activity was on the point of starting. In the downwind leg, confronted with this unplanned situation, the element of surprise may have sufficiently destabilized him so as to have affected his discernment. He thus did not know how to react and then encountered difficulties with holding the aeroplane’s vertical path on the nominal descent slope and as a consequence, controlling his speed in final. The fact of not feeling comfortable in a situation of dense glider activity may have led him to not fly a go-around during the approach.

The BEA has sent four safety recommendations, one to the aerodrome operator, one to the DGAC and two to the DSAC with a view to raising the operators’ awareness of the risks linked to co-activity and having the risks linked to the simultaneous use of intersecting runways taken into account in regulations.