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Incident to the Embraer ERJ190 registered F-HBLJ operated by HOP! and the fixed-wing microlight ATEC 321 identified 84OM on 05/06/2024 at Marseille Provence

Airprox between a passenger commercial air transport aeroplane carrying out a go-around and a microlight in cruise

Responsible entity

France - BEA

Investigation progression Closed
Progress: 100%

The microlight pilot read back a message from the Provence Tower controller, indicating a frequency change, addressed to the crew of flight AFR51ST departing from Marseille - Provence airport. The Tower controller did not notice the read back error and confirmed the
frequency change.

The microlight pilot interpreted the instruction as acceptance of his transit through the CTR, which required him to cross the axis of runway 31R, which was in use (see paragraph 2.2.2). He then left the Tower frequency for the Approach frequency. Shortly afterwards, the Tower controller realized the read-back error and tried unsuccessfully to contact the microlight pilot again to instruct him to remain on the Tower frequency and perform a 360° holding pattern.

On the Provence Approach north sector frequency, the microlight pilot and the Approach controller could not hear each other due to the microlight's position, which was below the area covered by the transceiver located several kilometres away. At the same time, the Tower controller no longer had a means of contacting the microlight pilot, who had left his frequency.

As the microlight approached the runway axis, the crew of flight AFR65YU, on final for runway 31R, realized they were not stabilized and decided to reject the approach. The go-around flight path of flight AFR65YU conflicted with that of the microlight, and the pilots of the two aircraft were not aware of each other's respective positions. A TCAS alert was triggered on board flight AFR65YU and the minimum separation between the two aircraft was 389 m (0.17 NM horizontally and 775 ft vertically).

The crew of flight AFR51ST, who at this time were at more than 5,000 ft and climbing, could hear the microlight pilot’s and Approach controller’s messages. They took the initiative of contacting the microlight pilot to inform him of the error and suggested that he contacted the Tower controller again, which the microlight pilot did. At this point, the axis had been crossed and the airprox had already occurred.