Serious incident to the De Havilland DHC-6 registered F-OMYR operated by Caire on 10/04/2022 at the vertical of Saint-François AD (Guadeloupe)
Loss of separation with parachutists during the approach, during proficiency check flight
The crew of F-OMYR were carrying out a local proficiency check flight from Pointe-à-Pitre - Le Raizet airport, where runway 12 was in use. The pilot of F-GERB was dropping parachutists in the Saint-François drop zone, located near one of the legs of the RNP procedure for runway 30 at Pointe-à-Pitre - Le Raizet airport.
The controller who had held the GND/TWR/APP positions was relieved by a colleague. After the handover, the crew of F-OMYR requested clearance to carry out an RNP approach for runway 30, which the controller accepted. The Saint-François parachute drop zone was not configured and could not be displayed on the controller's radar screen. The procedures for runway 12 were displayed and the controller also displayed waypoints DULBO and LOMPA of the RNP 30 procedure. Recently qualified, the controller had little experience of using this procedure and the runway 30 configuration at Pointe-à-Pitre. When the pilot of F-GERB reported that he was going to carry out another dropping, the controller did not anticipate that the flight path of F-OMYR could be in conflict with that of the parachutists.
When the pilot of F-GERB called back one minute before the dropping, the controller gave him the implicit authorisation to start the dropping, using the phraseology “report dropping completed” and not the phraseology expected in controlled airspace, “dropping approved”. The crew of F-OMYR did not realise that the parachute dropping had been approved and thought that the controller's instructions would ensure their separation from the parachutists and the dropping aircraft. The controller was then busy communicating with another aeroplane. The crew of F-OMYR turned south shortly before the fly-by waypoint DULBO, as specified in the RNP 30 procedure. The controller was surprised by the flight path of F-OMYR and then became aware of the conflict. He tried, without success, to contact the pilot of F-GERB. As the controller did not know the position of the parachutists, he did not give any instructions to the crew of F-OMYR for fear of aggravating the situation. The crew of F-OMYR continued with the procedure, unknowingly crossing the dropping path and passing close to a parachutist tandem without detecting their presence.