Accident to the Aero AT3 R100 registered F-GNMU on 02/01/2021 at Toussus-le-Noble (Yvelines)

Cat. 3 investigation report: report concerning an occurrence with limited consequences, based on one or more statements not independently validated by the BEA.

This is a courtesy translation by the BEA of the Final Report on the Safety Investigation published in October 2021. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French is the work of reference.

Note: The following information is principally based on statements made by the student pilot and the instructor. This information has not been independently validated by the BEA.

1 - HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT

The student pilot, accompanied by an instructor, performed aerodrome circuits at Toussus-le-Noble aerodrome[1]. At the end of the sixth and last circuit for runway 25L, the aeroplane touched down hard and bounced. During the go-around, the aeroplane rolled to the left and the left wing touched the runway. The instructor took back control of the aeroplane and landed in the grass at the edge of the runway. During the run, the nose gear bent.

2 - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2.1 Meteorological information

The weather conditions provided in the ATIS message at the time of take-off were as follows: wind from 340° at 3 kt, visibility 9 km, broken clouds at 3,100 ft, temperature 2° C.

2.2 Pilot information

The 27-year-old student pilot had started training for a private pilot licence PPL(A) in November 2019. He had logged 15 flight hours. This was his first flight after the interruption due to the health crisis. His last flight had been on 18 October 2020.
The 24-year-old instructor held a CPL(A) commercial pilot licence issued on 11 April 2019, with an instructor rating issued in January 2020. He had logged around 550 flight hours, 300 hours of which were as an instructor.

2.3 Student pilot’s statement

The student pilot stated that after the first five aerodrome circuits, the instructor expressed satisfaction that he had not lost his skills during the break in flying. He explained that he had felt under a bit of pressure to perform the last circuit as satisfactorily as the previous ones. He was not confident because he was slightly high on the approach slope with a speed of 60 kt, which exceeded the desired speed by 5 kt.
He indicated that during the flare, in order to reduce the landing distance, the instructor had made an input on the stick. After the bounce, which he estimated at one or two metres, he thought that the aeroplane was deviating to the right and made left stick and rudder inputs. At the same moment, the instructor called for a go-around and then applied power[2] at the same time as he did. The student pilot felt that the application of power may have affected the magnitude of the movement associated with his left correction.
He explained that he did not hear the instructor ask him to return to neutral. He was holding the controls tightly. When the wing hit the ground, he let go of the controls.
He believed that fatigue may have contributed to the event.
He said that during the briefing the instructor mentioned the following threats: the break in flying, the potentially restricted visibility on the west side and the possibility of a collision. The go-around was not mentioned. He said that a go-around for an unstabilised approach is rarely mentioned. He added that he had previously carried out just one go-around (apart from those related to touch-and-goes) which had been decided earlier in the approach.

2.4 Instructor’s statement

The instructor indicated that he had planned to let the student pilot fly solo after one or two more sessions, as the use of the checklists had yet to be validated.
He stated that at the beginning of the final approach, three white and one red PAPI lights were visible, but that after passing the decision height the aeroplane was stabilised at 60 kt, the approach speed advised by the club.
He estimated that the bounce was slight, about 10 cm. He preferred, for educational purposes, to ask for a go-around so that the student pilot could acquire this reflex in case of a bounce. Usually, in the case of a go-around, he would wait a short time to let the student pilot operate the throttle and would guide the movement if necessary. In this case, he thought they had made an input together.
The instructor stated that the student pilot did not counter the effects of the engine but made left inputs on the controls. He tried to counter with right inputs but they were ineffective. He indicated to the student pilot that he needed to level the aeroplane, that the wing might touch the ground and that he had the controls. When the wing touched the ground, the student pilot let go of the controls. Not being able to assess the damage, the instructor preferred to land, especially as they were not very high. According to the instructor, the aeroplane climbed to a maximum height of 2.5 m.
The instructor explained that the go-around is discussed during a ground briefing with student pilots during their first aerodrome circuits. After 15 flight hours, they are familiar with the go-around. Before releasing a student pilot, the instructor checks that he has already performed go-arounds.

3 - CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions are solely based on the information which came to the knowledge of the BEA during the investigation. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability.

On bouncing on landing, the student pilot made left stick and rudder inputs, as he thought that the aeroplane was deviating to the right. At the same time, at the instructor's request, a go-around was performed. The aeroplane rolled to the left under the combined effect of the student pilot's inputs and the engine effects. As the student had a tight grip on the controls, the instructor's inputs on the controls were ineffective. When the left wing touched the runway, the student let go of the controls and the instructor landed in the grass at the edge of the runway.
The following factors may have contributed to the aeroplane entering a roll and the wing touching the ground:

• Student pilot/instructor interaction during the landing and go-around phase;
• Acute stress during the go-around, which contributed to the student pilot tightly holding the controls and prevented him from perceiving the instructor's demands.