Accident to the fixed-wing ultralight FK9 identified 10NA on 13/10/2024 at Vesvres

This is a courtesy translation by the BEA of the Final Report on the Safety Investigation. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French is the work of reference.

Note: the following information is principally based on the pilot’s statement. This information has not been independently validated by the BEA.

1. HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT
The day before the accident, the pilot planned to collect his microlight which had undergone maintenance work from Chalon - Champforgeuil aerodrome and return it to La Rosétaine microlight strip. As the weather was adverse for the flight, he postponed it until Sunday.

On Sunday morning, he consulted the weather information several times, prepared his cross-country flight and took off. The weather conditions deteriorated along the route, the pilot continued his flight. At an altitude of around 1,500 ft , the pilot inadvertently entered a cloud layer twice, and lost all external visual references for a few seconds. He lost all external visual references again for a third time, and decided to activate the airframe parachute. He pulled the parachute deployment handle, and after about two seconds felt the parachute open. He regained sight of the ground, and the microlight descended under the canopy, nose down, wings flat, for what he estimated to be around ten seconds before hitting the ground.

The uninjured pilot evacuated the microlight.

2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

2.1 Microlight information
10NA is a FK9 high fixed wing microlight equipped with a BRS airframe parachute since being put into service in 2005. It has conventional “needle” instruments and is not equipped with an artificial horizon.

The damage resulting from the airframe parachute landing was limited to the landing gear, engine cowlings and propeller.

2.2 Pilot’s additional statement
The pilot held a microlight certificate with the fixed-wing rating, and a PPL(A) with an expired SEP rating. He estimated his total experience as around 500 flight hours. He had already flown under IFR as a passenger, and had practised blind navigation in the past.

He explained that he entered into a sort of get-home-itis mode during this flight, that he had borne the conditions rather than trying to anticipate them, and that he had never considered turning around, despite the worsening weather, contrary to his usual habits.

He had always been convinced of the usefulness of the airframe parachute. His previous microlight had also been equipped with one. He was afraid of a mid-air collision with another aircraft and explained that this was his main reason for using the parachute. Before each flight, he would repeat the act of activating the parachute handle, and removed the pin before starting up. He had informed himself about using the airframe parachute by means of Federation publications and pilot feedback videos.

He explained that he did not think to shut down the engine before deploying the parachute or before impact. 

April 2025