Accident to the JMB VL3 identified 59DUJ on 19/06/2020 at Mortemer
Loss of control en route, collision with ground
The pilot and passenger had planned to fly to Figeac-Livernon aerodrome to visit the passenger’s parents and prepare the organisation of future group cross-country flights in the region. The day preceding the day of the accident, the crew had postponed the flight due to adverse meteorological conditions.
The day of the accident, a flight plan was filed for a cruise altitude of 3,000 ft with the route passing via the Abbeville and Rouen VORs. Just before departing, the pilot told a witness that he was going to try and fly on top of the clouds that were straight ahead in the distance.
On crossing the border and on first radio contact with the Lille Air Navigation Service (ANS) which manages the Lille Flight Information Sector (FIS), 59DUJ was at an altitude of 3,500 ft. At this point, the pilot asked the controller several times for clearance to climb to avoid clouds on his route. The highest level reached was FL 080 which is usually reserved for IFR flights.
Shortly after flying over the Abbeville VOR, the pilot progressively turned left, changing direction by around 20°. He probably wanted to avoid the cloud front that was on his right. Once established on this new route, he was around 15 NM from the Paris Terminal Manoeuvring Area 7 (TMA), class A airspace prohibited to VFR flights above FL 065.
Soon after, the Lille controller asked the pilot of 59DUJ to contact the Paris Info Flight Information Centre (FIC) without having first coordinated with the latter. The radar blip for 59DUJ was only displayed on the screen of the Paris FIC agent three minutes after first contact with the FIC due to the pilot having initially made an error when squawking the transponder code. This error could be explained by the heavy workload from having to skirt around cloud masses. When the radar blip appeared on the screen of the FIC agent, 59DUJ was in class G airspace at FL 080, around one flight minute from entering TMA 7.
The FIC agent repeatedly ordered the pilot to turn right in order to join the area where the TMA lower limit was FL 085 (TMA 9) and asked him not to descend.
The pilot did not mention that he could not turn right because of the cloud front. He initially turned left and entered the class A area by around 500 m inside the limit. The FIC agent was focused on the pilot avoiding TMA 7 by the west. The pilot for his part then reduced his speed, descended and started piloting manually in order to then continue his route below FL 065 and TMA 7, announcing this over the radio. The tight turns in descent suggest that the pilot might have wanted to spiral in an opening in the cloud layer while trying not to continue manoeuvring inside the class A area. He performed two right-hand turns in a globally descending trajectory which resulted in him exiting TMA 7 and then entering it again.
Then during a left turn with a bank angle of 49° and an indicated airspeed of 73 kt, the microlight reached the stall angle and the pilot lost control of the aircraft. The pilot, aware they were falling, was unable to regain control of the microlight. The airframe parachute was not activated before the collision with the ground.
It was not possible to determine if, during the descent to avoid the TMA, the microlight entered the cloud layer.
The BEA has issued one safety recommendation with respect to the organisation of the flight information service and assistance for VFR flights in difficulty in France.
The BEA issues 1 safety recommendation:
- Organisation of the flight information service and assistance to VFR flights in difficulty [Recommendation FRAN-2023-022]
The BEA recommends that:
- whereas the flight information service is an important component of VFR flight safety;
- whereas good coordination between units would mean better anticipation and therefore better management of aircraft by the agents providing the flight information service;
- whereas a good level of use of radiotelephony in English is necessary for agents providing the flight information service;
- whereas agents providing the flight information service are not sufficiently trained to assist and recognise VFR flights in difficulty;
- whereas FIC agents have no information available to them regarding en-route meteorological conditions likely to hinder VFR flights;
- whereas the 17 accidents between 2010 and 2020 in which the air navigation services with which the pilots were in contact were unable to detect difficult situations or provide proactive and appropriate assistance;
- whereas the safety recommendations and lessons issued by the BEA in the safety reports concerning the accidents involving F-GPIT, F-HEHM, F-BXEU and 37AHH on the quality and availability of the flight information service;
the DSNA review the organisation of the flight information service, the positioning of this service in relation to all the air services provided by the DSNA and the training of the agents providing this service in French airspace, paying particular attention to the following subjects:
- coordination between the centres and the automatic display of active VFR flight plans so that the agents can sufficiently anticipate the arrival of VFR flights,
- assignment of staff to the positions according to the volume of VFR traffic,
- training and skill levels required to provide flight information,
- specific training in detecting and assisting VFR flights in difficulty, even if no distress message has been sent or the pilot has not verbalised his difficulties,
- equipment so that staff are aware in real time, of the meteorological situation en route and of large-scale meteorological conditions likely to prevent VFR flights from continuing their navigation.
The status of the recommendations is available at SRIS2: click here
___________________________________________________________________
Note: in accordance with the provisions of Article 17.3 of Regulation No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation, a safety recommendation in no case creates a presumption of fault or liability in an accident, serious incident or incident. The recipients of safety recommendations report to the issuing authority in charge of safety investigations, on the measures taken or being studied for their implementation, as provided for in Article 18 of the aforementioned regulation.