Cat. 3 investigation report: report concerning an occurrence with limited consequences, based on one or more statements not independently validated by the BEA.

This is a courtesy translation by the BEA of the Final Report on the Safety Investigation published in June 2021. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French is the work of reference.

Note: The following information is principally based on statements made by the pilot. This information has not been independently validated by the BEA.

1 - HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT

The pilot, accompanied by a passenger, carried out a flight from Chambley aerodrome where the aeroplane was based. He topped up the tanks and then taxied to runway 23L. He took off and, on leaving the aerodrome circuit, took a heading of 235° towards Saint-Mihiel, climbing to an altitude of 3,000 ft.
He then carried out manoeuvres around the village of Saint-Mihiel for about ten minutes before heading towards Metz-Nancy-Lorraine airport with the intention of making a touch-and-go. He contacted the aerodrome control service by radio, who asked him to call back when in sight of the aerodrome.
The controller suggested to the pilot that he join the aerodrome circuit by a flyover followed by a left-hand circuit for runway 22. The pilot asked for clearance to directly join the right-hand downwind leg. He called back once in the downwind leg and specified that his airspeed was 150 km/h.
The controller cleared him for a touch-and-go and announced a wind from 160° of 10 kt. The pilot decided to increase his approach airspeed from 115 km/h to 120 km/h. He indicated that he had extended the flaps to the second flap detent position. The pilot explained that, during the flare, he applied the crosswind landing technique (rudder and stick combination), slowly releasing the nose-up input. He remembered that the main landing gear touched the runway gently. On the nose gear touching the ground, the aeroplane began to swerve to the left. The pilot explained that he was very surprised by this behaviour and added that he kept a nose down input on the stick to unlock the nose wheel steering control mechanism. He applied full right rudder in order to bring the aeroplane back to the centreline of the runway but was unable to do so. He indicated that he used the brakes situated on top of the rudder pedals.
The aeroplane continued to run to the left through the grass which was wet and slowed down the aeroplane, which came to rest in a ditch about one meter deep, at 74 m from the runway centreline and about 750 m from the runway threshold.

2 - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2.1 Meteorological information

Extract from the ATIS message from Metz-Nancy-Lorraine airport recorded at 13:14 UTC:

- Runway 22 in use;
- Wind 150°, 11 kt;
- Visibility 10 km;
- Few clouds at 2,300 ft;
- Temperature 12° C / dew point temperature 7° C;
- QNH 1,021 hPa.

The wind announced by the aerodrome control service to the pilot on short final was 160° at 10 kt. The crosswind component on runway 22 (218°) was therefore 9 kt coming from the left of the aeroplane.

2.2 Pilot information

The 19-year-old pilot held a PPL(A) issued in July 2018. On the day of the accident, he had logged approximately 80 flight hours, 29 hours of which were solo, mostly on the Robin R 2120[1]. He had carried out around 17 flight hours on the DR 400 of which seven solo flight hours. In the last three months and last 30 days, he had carried out one solo flight hour on type.

2.3 Aircraft information

The pilot stated that the person who had performed the previous flight on the morning of the occurrence, had not reported any anomalies in the log book. He added that he himself had not observed any problems during the taxi and the take-off run of the accident flight. The nose gear and main right landing gear broke on entering the ditch.
According to the DR 400-140B flight manual, the acceptable crosswind component for take-off is 22 kt. This is not a limitation.
Between 2017 and 2020, this aeroplane experienced four runway overruns, during which it was damaged three times.
The maintenance unit in charge of the repairs did not detect any malfunctions in the landing gear or the aeroplane's controls that could explain the occurrence. However, after these repairs and then another accident in similar circumstances in December 2020, the aeroplane was examined by an approved maintenance workshop. This examination revealed incorrect rigging of the rudder pedal position in relation to the firewall. According to Robin Aircraft, this defect can have a significant effect on the inputs to be made on the rudder pedals to steer the aeroplane, making it more difficult to control.

2.4 Safety lessons learned

The BEA published a study[2]  specifying the conditions under which runway overruns occurred in general aviation. A lack of coordination of rudder/stick inputs was often behind these losses of control. Attention is drawn to the "limited experience of most of the pilots involved", who may have difficulty in mobilising the necessary resources in this complex flight phase.