Cat. 3 investigation report: report concerning an occurrence with limited consequences, based on one or more statements not independently validated by the BEA.
This is a courtesy translation by the BEA of the Final Report on the Safety Investigation published in July 2021. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French is the work of reference.
Note: The following information is principally based on statements made by the pilot. This information has not been independently validated by the BEA.
1 - HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT
The morning of the day of the accident, the pilot, accompanied by a passenger, carried out an IFR flight from La Môle bound for Quiberon. The flight lasted three hours and forty minutes and the return flight was planned in the afternoon. After landing at Quiberon, the pilot was informed that there was no possibility of refuelling with AVGAS fuel, which had not been specified by NOTAM. The pilot thus decided to refuel at Vannes aerodrome before leaving for La Môle. He indicated that he was upset due to the situation and the bad weather conditions in the sector.
During the pre-flight inspection at Quiberon, the pilot added oil. He indicated that he also carried out a pre-flight inspection before taking off from Vannes.
During the take-off from runway 22, the aeroplane rotated in the first third of the runway. Just after the rotation, the pilot saw that the engine cowling door was open. He immediately thought he had forgotten to lock the oil gauge. He decided to reject the take-off and to land on the remaining runway. The runway being long, he thought he could stop before the runway threshold.
He put the power and mixture controls in the “idle and cut-off” positions and tried to land quickly.
As the PA46 had reached a significant airspeed, the wheels came into contact with the ground again about 200m from the end of the runway. The aeroplane overran the runway and crossed the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) . It came to a stop about 100 meters after the end of the runway, on a landfill.
2 - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2.1 Pilot information and experience
The 69-year-old pilot held a private pilot licence and an IFR rating issued by the American authorities. At the date of the accident, he had logged 845 flight hours of which 565 hours on N898BB. He had flown 60 hours since the end of the lock-down in May, all on N898BB.
2.2 Vannes aerodrome information
Vannes-Meucon aerodrome consists of two runways: an unpaved runway oriented 08/26 measuring 995 x 60 m and a paved runway oriented 04/22 measuring 1,530 x 45 m which is equipped with a 90 m RESA. Earthworks carried out shortly before the date of the accident had reduced the difference in height between the end of the RESA and the natural ground. This difference, which was about 2.50 m before the work, has been reduced to 0.50 m.
2.3 Meteorological information
During the take-off, the estimated weather conditions were as follows: wind from 280° at 17 to 25 kt, visibility over 10 km, few clouds at 1,700 ft, broken ceiling at 2,200 ft, QNH 1006 hPa.
3 - MEASURES TAKEN AFTER THE ACCIDENT
The owner and operator of the aerodrome are considering the possibility of adding soil over the landfill in order to make the overrun beyond the RESA safe.
 Rectangular area extending beyond the end of the runway, mainly designed to reduce the risks of material damage in case of a short landing, or a runway overrun during landing or during take-off.