In addition to the European regulatory obligation to open an investigation into all accidents involving a certified aircraft, the BEA introduced a policy in 2015 to also investigate microlight accidents in which people were fatally injured. This review is therefore limited to fatal accidents.

In 2022, the BEA published 18 reports relating to fatal microlight accidents, broken down into class of microlight as follows:

• four occurrences concerning paramotors (class 1) identified as 83AWI, 95AHL, 76YD and 95WG;
• four occurrences concerning flex-wing microlights (class 2) identified as 79HX, 67CBG, 30SR, and 31RS;
• nine occurrences concerning fixed-wing microlights (class 3) identified as 54AMK, 57BOI, OO-H81, 70HZ, 40FJ, 71LO, 95SN, 01VA, 63ASZ;
• one occurrence concerning ultra-light helicopters (class 6) identified as 83AQG.

A total of 25 people were fatally injured in all these accidents. Four topics stand out in particular in these reports.

1. Aircraft maintenance

In principle, microlights are characterised by a simple design and simple maintenance entrusted to the owner, who can call on the manufacturer or a professional if the operations to be carried out exceed his knowledge. Several reports published in 2022 mention technical faults in flight that pilots had been unable to manage and that led to fatal accidents.

The accident to the flex-wing microlight 31RS on 29 July 2021 at Le Fousseret occurred during the first flight after a maintenance operation. A few days before, the pilot, owner of the microlight, had replaced a wing batten and to do so had handled the tautening system. After this operation, the pilot did not put the hook and ball pin of this system back in position and the wing partially folded during the take-off. This occurrence was reported in the magazine ULM info No 121 published by the FFPLUM  (French microlight Federation). Advice is given on how to reduce the risk of errors or omissions, such as placing a flag marker or other brightly coloured marking on sensitive parts to attract the attention of the mechanic after a maintenance operation.

Two losses of control occurred as a result of a decrease in engine power during the initial climb. During the accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 70HZ on 21 February 2021 at Saint-Florentin - Chéu, the disconnection of an electronic ignition unit was probably the cause of the power loss. The pilot, who owned the microlight, had replaced the two original electronic ignition units. In the accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 01VA that occurred on 30 September 2021 at Saint-Rambert-d'Albon, a fuel leak from a poorly positioned fuel strainer seal caused the tanks to dry out, which the pilot did not detect. The power loss occurred during the initial climb after a touch-and-go landing.

During the accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 40FJ on 23 April 2021 at Grayan-et-l'Hôpital, an outbreak of smoke in the cockpit, due to an electrical short-circuit, may have occurred in flight. A tangle of electrical wires bound with electrician's tape was located under the central pedestal, indicating modifications to the microlight's electrical system that were far from the state of the art in this area. Several electrical cables were found melted or stripped, indicating a high temperature in their environment. The passenger on this flight, who was a co-owner of the microlight, was in charge of the maintenance.

The four accidents mentioned above involved microlights of simple design. Some so-called sophisticated microlights have more advanced design and maintenance characteristics. This is particularly true of ultra-light helicopters, which are by nature more complex than other categories of microlight. On 24 September 2019, near Montelimar, an instructor and his student lost control of the LH212 identified 83AQG following the failure of a tail rotor blade. The failure was caused by progressive fatigue damage, what caused this fatigue damage and its propagation speed could not be determined. It was difficult to detect fatigue cracking in a tail rotor blade before it became extensive with conventional workshop methods. A similar scenario had occurred 17 months earlier on another LH212. The consequences were only material and the damage sequence leading to the occurrence was not identified by the operator and no safety action which could have prevented the second accident was taken. Following the second accident, the DGAC (the French civil aviation authority) issued an airworthiness directive prohibiting the operation of an LH212 equipped with a tail rotor manufactured by LCA.

Eight people were fatally injured and one was injured in the above-mentioned occurrences.

2. Management of aerological conditions

Microlights, due to their low weight, can be particularly sensitive to the aerology. An erroneous assessment of the aerological conditions during the take-off or landing phases can lead to a significant reduction in safety margins in relation to obstacles or to losses of control when the aircraft is at low speed and close to the ground.

The accident to the paramotor identified 76YD on 14 August 2021 at Életots occurred during take-off, at a height of about 10 m. It is possible that the pilot was surprised by aerological instabilities caused by the presence of a cliff nearly 90 m high and located 700 m from the microlight strip.

During the accident to the paramotor identified 83AWI on 14 December 2020 at Fréjus, the pilot was confronted with a massive collapse of his wing, possibly linked to a rapid change in wind direction and the appearance of gusts. The nose-down trim setting may have contributed to this collapse. Although the occurrence was in the cruise phase, the pilot was flying at a low height at the time of the event and did not manage to regain control of the flight path before the collision with the ground.

In the accident to the flex-wing microlight identified 79HX on 9 August 2020 at Aslonnes, the pilot, on encountering turbulence, aborted his approach on short final. He was then unable to maintain control of the flight path of the flex-wing microlight which collided with trees. The presence of a tailwind with a crosswind component from the right, accompanied by turbulence, combined with engine effects, may have made the management of this phase of flight more difficult. The pilot was not aware that he was flying an approach with a tailwind.

In the accident to the fixed-wing microlight 63ASZ on 22 August 2020 at Ceyssat, the pilot undertook a landing in a sloping field unaware of the significant tailwind component. The microlight hit the ground hard and bounced, probably due to an aerological phenomenon. The pilot then went around at low speed, with full flaps and a tailwind component. He was unable to gain height or speed and the microlight collided with trees.

Other occurrences giving rise to reports published in 2022 in which aerological conditions are identified as a possible contributing factor

• Accident to the paraglider identified 95WG on 6 September 2021 at Trébrivan: loss of engine power, loss of control, collision with the ground.
• Accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 70HZ on 21 February 2021 at Saint-Florentin - Chéu aerodrome: engine failure during initial climb, low-height aerodrome circuit, steep turn and collision with the ground during landing.

Five people were fatally injured, two were seriously injured and one was injured in the above-mentioned occurrences.

3. Attempts to turn around after engine power reduction on take-off

In 2021, the BEA published a study, Reduction in engine power at take-off. The study concluded that:

"One main fact is established by the study of this sample: all fatal injuries were the result of a loss of control in flight. The occupants are generally exposed to more energy during an impact caused by a loss of control in flight than during a controlled collision with obstacles in flight and, of course, always more than during a hard landing and/or a landing on a rough surface or surface with obstacles.

These losses of control in flight most often occur when making a significant change to the heading, indeed when attempting to turn around, during which the stall speed increases significantly” thus reducing the safety margin against stalling.

The report on the accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 71LO on 30 July 2021 at Vesoul-Frotey illustrates this safety topic.

Similar occurrences giving rise to reports published in 2022

• Accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 70HZ on 21 February 2021 at Saint-Florentin - Chéu aerodrome: engine failure during initial climb, low-height aerodrome circuit, steep turn and collision with the ground during landing.
• Accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 01VA on 30 September 2021 at Saint-Rambert-d'Albon: reduction in engine power during initial climb, right turn, stall.

Five people were fatally injured and one was injured in the above-mentioned occurrences.

4. Stall on fixed-wing microlight

Of the nine reports published in 2022 involving a fixed-wing microlight, eight concerned stall situations. These losses of control occurred in a wide variety of contexts and phases of flight.

Examples include the accident to 40FJ mentioned in the Aircraft Maintenance topic above and the accidents  to 70HZ, 71LO and 01VA mentioned in the Attempts to turn around after engine power reduction on take-off topic.

In the accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 95SN on 4 September 2021 at Woignarue, the pilot probably encountered adverse weather conditions for visual flight. Less than five minutes after take-off, the microlight stalled several times before colliding with the ground.

In these five accidents, the pilots were confronted with situations that could generate significant stress. In these conditions and in the absence of an audible warning of the approaching stall, it may be difficult to perceive the symptoms presaging  the stall.

For three accidents, the investigations did not identify unusual or marginal flight conditions. The three microlights were not equipped with stall warning devices and for one of them, the installation of vortex generators on the wing had the effect of reducing the intensity of the vibrations on approaching the stall (buffeting).

• Accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 54AMK on 3 June 2017 at Nacy-Malzéville: loss of control during initial climb, collision with the ground, fire.
• Accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified 57BOI on 23 April 2018 at Channay-sur-Lathan: loss of control during a go-around, collision with the ground, solo instruction.
• Accident to the fixed-wing microlight identified OO-H81 on 21 August 2018 at Rue: loss of control during instruction flight, collision with the ground, fire.

Fourteen people were fatally injured and 1 seriously injured in the above-mentioned occurrences.

This topic was addressed in the review of microlight reports published in 2021.

Other reports published in 2022

• Accident to the paramotor identified 95AHL on 8 March 2021 at Persan-Beaumont: loss of control during manoeuvres.

It is possible that the loss of control was the result of the pilot feeling unwell and/or disorientated due to paroxysmal vertigo. The report recalls the difficulty for microlight pilots to assess on their own, whether they are fit enough to fly safely given their medical history. The FFPLUM's federation doctor is available to assist pilots with any questions they may have about their medical fitness. This topic was addressed in the review of microlight reports published in 2021.

• Accident to the flex-wing microlight identified 67CBG on 28 April 2021 at Marckolsheim: collision with vegetation on final, collision with the ground.
• Accident to the flex-wing microlight identified 30SR on 28 May 2021 at Vairé: collision with vegetation on approach.???????